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INTRODUCTION 
Cartels have always been the highest concern of antitrust. They 
overcharge consumers many billions of dollars every year! and there is a 
strong consensus that they should be sanctioned heavily.2 Yet, until now 
no one has ever seriously attempted to analyze whether cartel sanctions 
are at the optimal level. This Article is the first to undertake this 
formidable task. Surprisingly, it demonstrates that the combined level of 
u.S. cartel sanctions has been only 9% to 21% as large as it should be to 
protect potential victims of cartelization optimally. This means that the 
average level of U.S. anti-cartel sanctions should be quintupled. 3 
Until now, no comprehensive empirical study has attempted to 
analyze whether cartels have been sanctioned optimally because of data 
constraints and the complexity and number of factors involved. The 
United States imposes a wide variety of sanctions against those who 
collude. These include criminal fines for the firms involved, prison, 
house arrest, and fines for the corporate officials involved.4 Victims can 
sue for mandatory treble damages and attorney's fees. 5 Judge Posner 
called this combination of sanctions the equivalent of dropping "cluster 
bombs" on defendants. 6 This multiplicity has led to the common-but 
unsupported-belief that the current level of sanctions is adequate7 or 
excessive.8 
1 See infra Part lILA. 
2 Strong anti-cartel policies are not only on the agenda of progressives; most conservatives 
advocate sanctioning cartels heavily. See, e.g., Frank A. Easterbrook, Treble What?, 55 
ANTITRUST 1.J. 95, 95 (1986). In 2004, the Bush Administration proposed and helped enact 
significant increases in the criminal fines against cartels. See Antitrust Criminal Penalty 
Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. 1. No. 108-237, ll8 Stat. 661,665-68 (substituting 
a $100 million maximum corporate fine for the existing $10 million maximum; a maximum $1 
million individual fine for the existing $350,000 maximum; and a maximum ten year prison 
sentence for the existing maximum three year sentence). 
3 Another option would be to implement ways to vastly improve the cartel detection rate. 
For an analysis of a number of alternatives, see infra Conclusions, Section A. 
4 ld. There also are such relatively unusual or minor sanctions as disgorgement actions by 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Department of Justice (DOJ). Although individual 
disgorgement cases can be important, they are relatively rare. See Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement 
as an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST 1.J. 79, 79 (2009). 
5 See 15 U.S.c. § 15 (2000). Prevailing plaintiffs also receive filing fees and expert witness 
fees.ld. 
6 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 940 (2001) 
[hereinafter Posner, Antitrust]. See generally Spencer Weber Waller, The Incoherence of 
Punishment in Antitrust, 78 CHI.-KENT 1. REv. 207 (2003). 
7 The ABA Antitrust 'Section, for example, recently opposed increasing the Sherman Act's 
criminal penalties: "Some also believe that combined criminal and civil penalties provide too 
much deterrence that will chill the bUSinessperson in his decision making .... Whether 
increased criminal penalties will provide an appropriate level of deterrence ... should be the 
subject of hearings and public briefings to reach the proper deterrence balance." SECTION OF 
ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR ASS'N, COMMENTS OF THE ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW ON 
H.R. 1086: INCREASED CRIMINAL PENALTIES, LENIENCY DETREBLING AND THE TUNNEY ACT 
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This Article employs a unique database to determine whether the 
United States' anti-cartel sanctions are optimal overall. It does this by 
analyzing the total, combined impact of every measurable anti-cartel 
sanction using the standard optimal deterrence approach. 9 This assumes 
corporations and individuals contemplating illegal collusion will be 
deterred only if the expected rewards are less than the expected costsJo 
divided by the probability the illegal activity will be detected and 
sanctioned.ll 
AMENDMENT 11-12 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/antitrust_Iaw/comments_increasedcriminalpenalties.authcheckdam.pdf. 
8 This view was eloquently articulated by Professors Lopatka & Page even before the 
criminal fine levels were significantly increased in 2004: "Even setting imprisonment aside, the 
federal criminal penalties are substantial. ... [and) today may well be high enough that the 
optimal penalty can be imposed through criminal sanctions alone .... It seems likely that the 
combination of federal penalties is adequate." John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Indirect 
Purchaser Suits and the Consumer Interest, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 531, 568 (2003) (footnote 
omitted); see also ABBOTT B. LIPSKY, LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP, PRIVATE DAMAGE REMEDIES: 
TREBLE DAMAGES, FEE SHIFTING, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 4-5 (2005), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Lipsky.pdf (statement to the 
Antitrust Modernization Commission) ("[S)o long as Section 1 and Section 2 violations can 
be-and in the case of cartel violations, typically are-prosecuted criminally and punished with 
actual incarceration for individuals and criminal fines .... [i)t is possible that the treble-damage 
claims unintentionally assume some of the characteristics of a wealth-transfer 
program ... [similar to) the retributive and unwise legal methods that produced or at least 
inflamed the Salem Witch Trials .... "); Criminal Remedies: Public Hearing Before the Antitrust 
Modernization Comm'n, at 83, Nov. 3, 2005, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/ 
commission_hearings/pdf/051103_ TranscripCCriminal_Remedies.pdf (statement of Anthony 
V. Nanni, former Chief of the National Criminal Enforcement Section in the Antitrust 
Division, U.S. Department of Justice) ("[W)hen you have such large corporate filles combined 
with the other framework-Le., civil treble damages-you really run the risk of pushing 
corporations to the brink of bankruptcy."). 
9 See infra notes 15-22 for an explanation of the standard optimal deterrence approach. As 
explained throughout this paper, including in notes 28 and 32 infra, we believe this Article's 
analysis is best carried out in relatively traditional, non-behavioralist terms. Some of the 
remedies we propose, however, fairly might be termed "behavioralist." See infra Part V.A. 
10 Optimal deterrence depends upon the rational conjectures or expectations of potential 
cartelists as to a number of factors when a cartel is being formed. Ideally, one would like to 
know how much would-be cartel managers or their employers expect to gain from their 
collusion, how likely it is they think they will be apprehended, and how large a corporate fine 
and how long a prison term they believe the managers and their employers will receive should 
they be caught. Managers may be carrying out a corporate decision, or they may be rogues. 
What goes on in the minds of potential cartelists is largely unexplored in the cartel literature 
(but for insights on this issue, see Michael O'Kane, Does Prison Work for Cartelists?: The View 
from Behind Bars, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 483 (2011)). We only can estimate how much 
discovered cartels have gained in the past, what the historical rate of discovery and conviction 
likely has been, and how heavily corporate participants and their employees have been 
sanctioned. We then assume the historical outcomes match the cartelists' expectations-an 
admittedly rough approximation. See infra Part LA for a more thorough discussion. 
11 In other words, a sanction slightly larger than $300 would be necessary if a cartel expects 
total overcharges to reach $lOO and believes there is a 1/3 chance its activities will be detected 
and condemned. In operational terms, the optimal penalty will be assumed to be equal to (the 
cartel's overcharges) + (the probability the cartel will be detected x the probability the detected 
collusion will be sanctioned). 
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Our analysis begins with calculations of the rewards from collusion 
in a sample of seventy-five cartel cases. We then survey the literature to 
ascertain the probability that cartels are detected and sanctioned. We 
further assemble data on the size of the sanctions involved in each case 
in our sample. These include the corporate fines, individual fines, and 
payouts in private damage actions for these cartels. Finally, we 
determine the opportunity cost (or disvalue) of imprisonment or house 
arrest for the individuals convicted in these seventy-five cases. 12 
Our optimal deterrence analysis 13 concludes that the combined 
level of u.s. cartel sanctions has been only 9% to 21% as large as it 
should be to protect potential victims of cartelization optimally. Hence, 
despite all the existing sanctions, collusion remains a rational business 
strategy. Cartels are a crime that, on average, pays. In fact, it pays very 
well. 
This Article proceeds in six Parts. Part I analyzes the optimal 
deterrence of cartels, including separate discussions of the necessary 
individual, as well as corporate perspectives and incentives. Part II 
analyzes the sizes of cartel sanctions in our sample of seventy-five cases: 
payments made in private damages actions, corporate fines, individual 
fines, restitution payments, and the monetary equivalents of 
imprisonment and house arrest for corporate officers engaged in 
collusion. Part III summarizes the field's empirical knowledge about the 
harms to society from collusion. Part IV ascertains the probability a 
cartel will be discovered and sanctioned. Part V combines the previously 
calculated figures, for our sample of seventy-five cartel cases, to produce 
our results. 
This Article's results should be of paramount importance to 
anyone interested in protecting the public against collusion. 
Accordingly a sixth, concluding section will discuss the implications of 
our research for public policies towards cartels. Because current cartel 
sanctions are far too low, we suggest specific ways they could be 
increased to become more nearly optimal. Doing so would save 
consumers billions of dollars each year. 
12 It is of course impossible to equate incarceration and monetary sanctions in an objective 
manner since this would mean computing the "value" or "cost" of time spent in prison or 
under house arrest. Nevertheless, this Article will examine several social science 
approximations of the disutility of prison time and house arrest, ascertaining and combining 
many different estimates in a conservative manner. See infra Part I.B. Consequently, the 
Article's overall assessment of the impact of incarceration will be both as accurate and non-
controversial as possible. 
13 As explained throughout this Article, we use the best available data for each part of the 
optimal deterrence calculation. Some information is known with certainty, but some of the 
required information is not available with as much precision or the degree of confidence we 
would like. In recognition of these imprecisions, we undertake a sensitivity analysis: We 
determine the highest and lowest likely values for each relevant factor and combine them into 
appropriate low and high estimates of the overaIl optimal deterrence tradeoff. 
2012] CARTELS AS BUSINESS STRATEGY 431 
1. OPTIMAL DETERRENCE: INDIVIDUAL VS. CORPORATE PERSPECTIVESI4 
How can cartels best be deterred? Should sanctions focus upon 
corporations, individuals, or both? How large should each category of 
sanctions be relative to the harms from collusion? 
A. Overall Framework for Analysis 
The generally accepted overall approach to the optimal deterrence 
of antitrust violations was developed by Professor William Landes. IS He 
showed that to achieve optimal16 deterrence l7 the damages from an 
14 This Part relies heavily upon and significantly extends some of the authors' earlier joint 
work. See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications 
for Reform of the Antitrust Sentencing Guidelines, 80 TULANE L. REv. 513 (2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=787907.This Part also relies upon John M. 
Connor, Problems with Prison in International Cartel Cases, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 311 (:Wll), 
and Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and 
Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 2011 BYU 1. REv. 315, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id= 1565693. 
15 William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 652, 
656 (1983) (adapting Gary Becker's well known "theory of crime" to examine price-fixing 
violations that are nearly always prosecuted as felony crimes by the DOJ; for that reason, the ex 
ante approach to analyzing crimes is dubbed "Beckerian"). By the early 1990s, the Beckerian 
formulation of the problem of policies designed to deter hard-core price-fixing violations had 
been adopted universally by legal-economic scholars. See Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences 
for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 409 (1979-1980) [hereinafter Posner, Optimal 
Sentences]. In addition, an alternative analysis of optimal anti-cartel poliCies has grown during 
the last decade. See, e.g., Paulo Buccirossi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, Optimal Fines in the Era of 
Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still Go to Prison?, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
ANTITRUST 81 (Vivek Ghosal & Johan Stennek 2007). This newer perspective on enforcement 
focuses on policies like corporate or individual leniency programs that may destabilize cartels 
that are already formed. Thus, we view policy prescriptions arising from this body of 
scholarship as ex post and, far from being contradictory, as supplementary to the ex ante 
policies we examine in the present Article. 
16 One might quite reasonably reason that, unlike the case for conduct that might violate 
the prohibitions against illegal monopolization, because price fixing is never in the public 
interest, we should attempt to design a regime that prevents all price fixing, not a regime that 
permits some "optimal" amount of price fixing. One might argue that we should not worry 
about imposing excessive penalties against cartels. 
Our quest should not be complete deterrence, however, because enforcement aggressive 
enough to deter all cartels almost certainly would penalize and therefore discourage some 
honest business conduct. As with any legal system, there is some uncertainty at the margin of 
cartel illegality. Beneficial horizontal conduct near this line, conduct that results in efficiency 
gains for society, sometimes could be mistaken for illegal collusion. For this and other reasons 
sanctions should not be excessive; they should only be as large as necessary to deter most of the 
undesirable conduct. To give an extreme example, a mandatory death penalty for price fixing, if 
regularly imposed, surely would chill a significant amount of procompetitive behavior because 
most people quite understandably would avoid doing anything that could give rise to even a 
small probability of being mistaken for price fixing. 
17 Professor Landes was not concerned with the compensation of victims. Landes, supra 
note 15. For an analysis that takes compensation into account, see Robert H. Lande, Are 
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antitrust violation should be equal to the violation's expected "net harm 
to others" 18 divided by the probability of detection and proof of the 
violation. 19 All figures should, of course, be expressed in constant 
dollars. Most analysts of both the Chicago and post-Chicago schools of 
antitrust have accepted these principles.2o The "net harm to others" 
from collusion, of course, includes the overcharges that result from 
Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 161-68 (1993), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=I134822. 
18 The logic underlying the "net harm to others" standard was explained clearly by 
Professors Breit and Elzinga. Their example is that of a horizontal carte!' However, in their 
example, the activity also produces a significant efficiency gain. Sometimes horizontal activity 
that produces a significant efficiency gain is labeled a "joint venture" rather than a "carte!." 
Other times "cartel" is simply a shorthand for horizontal activity that produces more losses 
than gains. 
The trick to discovering the optimal sanction is to find a rule that will force the 
potential cartelist to compare any cost saving from his activity with the deadweight 
loss triangle. If the cost saving were larger than the deadweight loss, it would be in his 
(and society's) interest to undertake the illegal activity. So after he deducts the 
monopoly profit rectangle ... the cartelist will examine the deadweight loss (the 
remainder of the fine to be paid) and compare it with the value of the cost saving. 
The fine that is the sum of the deadweight triangle plus the profit rectangle is the 
correct sanction since it will encourage the "right" amount of illegal antitrust activity. 
Damages larger than this could lead to over-deterrence .... 
A numerical example may help to clarify the concept of the optimal antitrust 
sanction. Assume that a potential cartelist calculates that joining a horizontal price-
fixing conspiracy will increase his profits by $100 million. He also is aware that the 
deadweight loss imposed on society by his activity is $50 million. If the expected 
value of the fine imposed is the entire amount of consumers' surplus ($150 million) 
would he enter the cartel? He would do so if he believed that the cartel would be 
accompanied by cost reductions to him greater than $50 million. If the cost saving 
were, say, $60 million, he would still enter the price-fixing conspiracy because he 
would know that his fine would be $100 million (his cartel profits) plus $50 million 
(the deadweight loss) leaving him $10 million more revenue than would be the case if 
he did not enter the carte!' In this case the cartel is accompanied by cost reductions 
greater than the deadweight loss it imposes on society. On efficiency grounds, it 
should be permitted. 
WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST PENALTY REFORM: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 11-12 (1986). 
19 See Landes, supra note IS, at 666-68. Thus, if the harm were 10 and the probability of 
detection and proof were .33, since 10/.33 = 30, the optimal penalty for this violation would be 
30. This assumes risk neutrality and other common assumptions. Id. 
20 See the discussion in Lande, supra note 17, at 161-68. Despite the general 
acknowledgement of the superiority of the Landes approach, however, many respected scholars 
and enforcers instead focus upon the gain to the lawbreakers, perhaps because it is Simpler to 
observe or calculate. For a recent example see Gregory J. Werden, Sanctioning Cartel Activity: 
Let the Punishment Fit the Crime,S EUR. COMPETITION J. 19, 28-31 (2009). For an insightful 
analysis see Wouter P.J. Wils, Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice, 29 WORLD 
COMPETITION 183, 190-93 (2006). For this Article's purposes, however, the precise optimal 
deterrence standard used is not crucial. Similar results would arise if this Article instead used a 
"gross harm to others" or a "net gain to the offenders" standard. 
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cartel pricing.21 They include many other-perhaps less obvious-
factors, as well. 22 
Moreover, since not every cartel is detected or successfully proven, 
the "net harm to others" should be multiplied by the inverse of the 
probability of detection and proof.23 The Antitrust Division's amnesty 
program has resulted in a significantly larger percentage of cartels 
detected and proven in recent years. 24 Nevertheless, there is continuing 
evidence that, despite the enforcers' superb efforts, many cartels still 
operate,25 so there is significantly less than a 100% probability that a 
21 See Landes, supra note 15. 
22 First, cartel market power produces allocative inefficiency-the deadweight loss welfare 
triangle. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND ApPLICATIONS 277-92 (4th 
ed. 1982) (defining allocative inefficiency and providing a proof that it is created by monopoly 
pricing). Allocative ineffiCiency often is significant empirically. See discussion infra Part II1.B. 
Nevertheless, it apparently has never been awarded in an antitrust case. See, e.g., David C. 
Hjelmfelt & Channing D. Strother, Jr., Antitrust Damages for Consumer Welfare Loss, 39 CLEV. 
ST. 1. REv. 505 (1991). 
Second, market power can produce "umbrella" effects, the name given to higher prices 
charged by non-violating members that were permitted or caused by the violation's 
supracompetitive prices. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
~ 337.3 (Supp. 1992). This factor also is never or virtually never awarded. rd. 
Moreover, there are several additional types of harms that often are caused by cartels. 
These include: 1) uncompensated plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs; 2) the uncompensated 
value of plaintiffs' time spent pursuing the case; and 3) the costs of the judicial system. See 
Lande, supra note 17, at 129-58. 
In addition, cartels may have less incentive to innovate or to offer as wide an array of 
non-price variety or quality options. Alternatively, one could argue that cartel members will 
have more funds to use for socially desirable innovation. We know of no evidence, however, 
that these innovation effects are Significant empirically. 
The price fixers' own legal costs, the disruption in their own efficiency as a result of 
sanctions litigation, and any harm to their corporate reputation, by contrast, are not "harms to 
others" from collusion, and therefore should not be included in the optimal deterrence analysis. 
23 "Multiplication is essential to create optimal incentives for would-be violators when 
unlawful acts are not certain to be prosecuted successfully. Indeed, some multiplication is 
necessary even when most of the liability-creating acts are open and notorious. The defendants 
may be able to conceal facts that are essential to liability." See Frank Easterbrook, Detreb/ing 
Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & ECON. 445, 455 (1985). 
24 See Nathan H. Miller, Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement, 99 AM. ECON. REv. 750 
(2009). 
25 See generally Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Sanctions, 6 
COMPETITION POL'y INT'L 3 (2010). The continued high number of DO) grand juries and the 
recent DOJ success rate in the courts also suggests that many cartels still exist. As of the close of 
fiscal year 2010 the DOJ had approximately 124 pending grand jury investigations. U.S. DEP'T 
OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2002-2011, at 4, [hereinafter 
WORKLOAD STATISTICS 2002-2011] available at http://www.justice.gov!atr/public/workload-
statistics.htm\. Between 2001 and 2010, the DOJ fIled from forty-four to sixty criminal cases per 
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cartel will be detected and convicted. From an optimal deterrence 
perspective, sanctions should be more than a cartel's "net harms to 
others" to account for the probability that the conduct will go 
unpunished. As noted earlier, if a cartel that expected to overcharge by 
$100 only faced a 33% chance it would be detected and proven to be 
illegal, the sanctions should slightly exceed $300. Without this 
multiplier firms would be simply undeterred from committing antitrust 
violations. 
Ideally, optimal deterrence should be based upon the expectations 
of potential price fixers, not the results of others' past price fixing or the 
sanctions imposed on similar cartels. 26 The required expectation 
knowledge, however, is impossible to obtain. 27 Guessing what goes on in 
year, most of which resulted in convictions. Id. at 4. The following table, extracted from this 
data, shows DOT's success in prosecuting antitrust violations: 
In the opinions of a large number of judges, grand juries, and juries, the DOJ Antitrust 
Division has been bringing a large number of meritorious anti-cartel cases in recent years. Note 
that in some years the DOJ won more cases than it filed because the cases the DOJ won in any 
given year were often filed in an earlier year. 
26 It would be extremely useful to know potential price fixers' perceptions of the probability 
that they will be caught and convicted of price fixing, and their belief as to how much they will 
be forced to pay. Moreover, as one distinguished cartel scholar noted, "[b]ecause of 
overconfidence bias, prospective offenders are likely to overestimate the gain and 
underestimate the probability of detection and punishment." See Wils, supra note 20, at 183. 
We know of no reliable information on this issue, however. Their expectations will, to 
some degree, be informed by their discussions with their antitrust lawyers, but there still could 
well be systematic differences between their expectations and reality. In addition, potential 
price fixers probably are likely to be risk seekers, and have other relevant psychological traits on 
the average. Moreover, there could be a difference between how much potential price fixers 
think they would be likely to earn from price fixing, and the amount a court or an economist 
measures after the fact. Similarly, there could be a difference between reality and their estimate, 
at the time of the price fixing, of the probability they will get caught and convicted, and their 
expectation as to how much the negotiated fine will be. In addition, optimal deterrence theory 
is based on the balance between the present value of expected future corporate profits from the 
conduct and the present value of expected future monetary sanctions. 
27 To ascertain this, one would have to interview a random sample of potential price fixers 
and discern their expectations. In reality, however, it would be impossible to assemble a proper 
random sample or to get them to respond candidly. A different way to frame the optimal 
deterrence issue is in terms of whether cartels usually know in advance of litigation roughly 
how much they will be found to have overcharged. Can most firms that are members of cartels 
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the minds of would-be cartelists is hazardous. Nor do we know how 
often potential price fIxers consult with their attorneys about the likely 
range of outcomes. 28 The best we can do is to ascertain how much 
overall (in terms of a median or a mean) cartels have raised prices in the 
past, and how often and how much they have been sanctioned, and 
assume these are close proxies for the expectations relevant to the 
decision whether to collude. 29 In effect, we are using a general 
deterrence approach because a specifIc deterrence approach is infeasible. 
B. Corporate vs. Individual Sanctions 
Even though the preceding analysis is accepted by most of the 
antitrust fIeld with relatively little controversy, it does not answer the 
question posed at the start of this Section: Is optimal deterrence best 
achieved by focusing only on the corporations involved?3o On the 
individuals involved? And if so, should this be done by fInes or through 
incarceration? Or through some combination of corporate and 
individual sanctions?31 
predict in advance of litigation, for example, that a court will find that it overcharged 5%, as 
opposed to 15%? 
In light of the probability that lengthy, protracted litigation could result in a high, or low, 
sanction result, another issue is how risk seeking or averse a particular corporation is. 
More generally, one might argue that our use of the standard optimal deterrence model 
(which assumes risk neutrality) for entire cartels is inappropriate. After all, if the most risk-
averse member of a cartel decides to turn in the cartel, the entire cartel will end. (This idea is 
not applicable at the decision to participate stage, however, because a cartel need not contain 
every firm within an industry to be largely successful.) For this reason the optimal deterrence 
target need only be the most risk-averse member of a cartel. It seems likely, however, that most 
cartelists are by nature risk seekers. Accordingly, the appropriate focus of an optimal deterrence 
calculation actually should be on the most risk-averse member of a group of risk seeking 
cartelists. Is this person/corporation net risk-neutral, net a risk avoider, or still a net risk 
seeker? We do not know. Experimental economics offer some promise of modeling choices of 
participants in cartel settings. However, to our knowledge no relevant experiments have been 
published on this issue. 
28 See generally D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance, and What Practitioners 
Really Think About Enforcement, 78 ANTITRUST 1.J. 201 (2012). 
29 For this reason, we readily acknowledge that we are administering an imperfect test using 
a surrogate for what we really would like to measure. 
30 This Section draws heavily upon material in Connor, supra note 14, and in Lande & 
Davis, supra note 14. 
31 One could attempt to analyze whether sanctions should be imposed on individuals 
and/or on corporations, and other issues examined in this Article, using a more explicitly 
behavioral approach. For an excellent behavioral analysis of related issues concerning collusion, 
see generally Maurice Stucke, Am I a Price Fixer? A Behavioral Economics Analysis of Cartels, in 
CRIMINALISING CARTELS: A CRITICAL INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY MOVEMENT 263 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id= 1535720. 
In light of this Article's conclusion that current cartel sanctions are Significantly 
suboptimal, however, a more explicitly behavioral approach would not Significantly enhance 
our analysis. Our analysis shows that current sanctions are much less than they should be to 
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Consideration of optimal sanctions for price fixing can be traced to 
Richard Posner's analysis of optimal cartel penalties. 32 According to this 
work, hard-core price fixing is optimally punished almost exclusively 
through corporate fines. 33 Only when a company is unable to pay an 
optimal fine should imprisonment be imposed as a last resort, and only 
if the individuals are unable to pay optimal fines. 34 
There are many arguments in favor of the criminalization of price-
fixing offenses.35 For example, publicity about severe sentences for price 
fixing may help educate other corporate executives about the true 
individual and corporate legal risks of being caught. 36 Publicity may also 
contribute to the effectiveness and costs of corporate antitrust 
compliance programs. Imprisonment could improve the operation of 
public antitrust leniency programs because, by shifting corporate 
officers' expectations toward high personal penalties, top executives of 
cartel participants are more likely to seek the immunity from 
deter cartels optimally, so it is unsurprising that firms contemplating collusion do so rationally 
and knOWingly. It is in their self interest to collude, so the explanation as to why they attempt to 
form cartels is relatively simple and straightforward. 
On the other hand, behavioral issues would be extremely important if the overall level of 
sanctions were optimal or super-optimal. Under these conditions one would have to explain 
why corporations continue to engage in the seemingly irrational behavior of illegal collusion. 
Under these circumstances, one should analyze, for example, issues such as whether managers 
who are worried about getting fired for poor performance have an incentive to defy top 
management's instruction not to engage in collusion by entering into a cartel with their 
competitors. If sanctions were optimal or super-optimal, a behavioral analysis could help 
decide how to stop this from happening. In light of this Article's conclusions that sanctions 
currently are too low, however, no such analysis is necessary. 
By contrast, many of our proposed solutions could be termed "behavioral." See infra 
Part V.A. 
32 Posner, Optimal Sentences, supra note 15. 
33 Id. The conventional wisdom in the field was well summarized in V.S. Khanna, Corporate 
Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1477 (1996) ("Thus, some 
justification for corporate criminal liability might have existed in the past, when civil 
enforcement techniques were not well developed, but from a deterrence perspective, very little 
now supports the continued imposition of criminal rather than civil liability on corporations."). 
34 Posner, Optimal Sentences, supra note 15. Posner argued for "the substitution, whenever 
possible, of the fine (or civil penalty) for the prison sentence as the punishment for crime." Id. 
at 409. Posner also acknowledged that he has made "an argument ... in the antitrust context 
for confining criminal (or civil-penalty) liability to the corporation, on the theory that if it is 
liable it will find adequate ways of imposing on its employees the costs to it of violating the 
law." Id. at 417-18. He observed: "The fine [or civil liability] for a white-collar crime can be set 
at whatever level imposes the same dis utility on the defendant, and thus yield the same 
deterrence, as the prison sentence that would have been imposed instead." Id. at 410. Yet the 
fines would save the cost to society of incarcerating the lawbreakers, and also, the opportunity 
cost to society of the time they spend in prison instead of working productively. Posner is 
familiar with resistance to this claim-indeed, his Article responds in part to a criticism that 
contends that the threat of imprisonment is inherently greater than that of a fine. [d. at 413. 
35 See the sources cited in Connor, supra note 14, for a summary of the legal-economic 
arguments for and against individual criminal penalties for antitrust violations, including the 
available game theory arguments. 
36 See infra note 45 (the example of Alfred Taubman). 
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prosecution that accompanies awards of corporate amnesty. In addition, 
public fines on employees can be SOcially optimal if principal-agent 
problems exist such that employees fail to take enough care to avoid 
legal risks for the corporation and the employer is unable to impose a 
financial penalty as high as the required public fine. 
Indeed, one could argue in the extreme that sanctions should focus 
mainly or exclusively upon individuals. Officials at the U.S. Department 
of Justice (DOT) Antitrust Division have been moving in this direction 
in recent years,37 as have some of the most respected members of the 
antitrust community, such as Judge Douglas Ginsburg and Professor 
Joshua Wright, who advocates lengthy debarment for negligent 
corporate officers and directors of publicly traded companies that fix 
prices.38 
37 For example, a 2006 speech by Scott Hammond contains a statement about the Division's 
belief that the threat of imprisonment overshadows all other sanctions as a cause of corporate 
leniency applications: 
It is indisputable that the most effective deterrent to cartel offenses is to impose 
jail sentences on the individuals who commit them. Corporations only commit cartel 
offenses through individuals, so executives as well as their employers need to be 
deterred from engaging in such conduct. Hard-core cartel offenses are premeditated 
offenses committed by highly educated executives. Before deciding whether to 
commit the offense, those executives weigh the risk and consequences of detection 
against the potential financial rewards of colluding. When an executive believes that 
incarceration is a possible consequence of engaging in cartel activity, he is far more 
likely to be deterred fronl committing the violation than if there is no individual 
exposure. This conclusion is not simply based on theories of human behavior or 
common sense. We have first-hand accounts from cartel members of how the 
presence or absence of individual sanctions has directly resulted in actual deterrence 
and continued competition in the U.S. market and failed deterrence, collusion, and 
great financial harm in foreign markets. 
We have uncovered international cartels that operated profitably and illegally in 
Europe, Asia, and elsewhere around the world, but did not expand their collusion to 
the United States solely because the executives decided it was not worth the risk of 
going to jail. I am referring to cartels that had every opportunity to target U.S. 
consumers. The cartel members sold in the U.S. market, and they were already 
getting together and fixing prices everywhere else they sold. Indeed, in some cases, 
the U.S. market was the largest and potentially most profitable, but the collusive 
conduct still ceased at the border. Why? The answer, from the mouths of the cartel 
members and verified by our investigators, is that the executives did not want to risk 
getting caught and going to jail in the United States. 
Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. for Criminal Enforcement, Antitrust Div., 
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Charting New Waters in International Cartel Prosecutions, Remarks at 
the National Institute on White Collar Crime (Mar. 2, 2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/214861.htm. 
38 See Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 25. Judge Ginsburg and Professor Wright certainly do 
not propose repealing corporate fines for price fixing. They do, however, advocate putting 
much more emphasis on individual sanctions. In particular, they propose lengthy debarment 
for negligent corporate officers and directors of publicly traded companies. Part of their 
preference for individual sanctions follows from their premise that the ever increasing levels of 
fines for price fixing have not sufficiently deterred collusion. 
We certainly agree with Ginsburg and Wright that even though corporate fines have risen 
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The extreme form of this argument specifically rejects the logic of 
optimal deterrence principles. The dominant law-and-economics model 
of crime posits that rational choices drive corporate decisions (including 
the decisions of the individuals involved) to commit crimes-a 
"cost/benefit analysis" of the decision. Consequently, there exists a 
bundle of sanctions that the legal system can (at least in theory) 
calculate that optimally will deter the crime. Unless there are principal-
agent problems,39 the monetary values of these individual sanctions are, 
in principle, perfect substitutes for one another. 40 
There certainly are counter-arguments to the desire for vastly 
higher individual penalties for cartelization (indeed, the United States is 
the only nation, among the roughly 200 countries with anti-cartel laws, 
that incarcerates significant numbers of cartel managers).41 Some have 
expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of individual sanctions in 
deterring antitrust crimes. An executive summary of a Policy 
Roundtable on this topic sponsored by the Oraganisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OEeD) asserted: "There is no 
significantly in recently years, there still is significant under-deterrence of collusion. Ginsburg 
and Wright do not, however, analyze the possibility that even the current levels of corporate 
fines are insufficient to deter price fixing optimally. Despite the higher fines of recent years, if 
corporations still expect to make a profit from collusion, still higher corporate sanctions might 
lead to optimal deterrence. 
39 If the firm is a proprietorship, it does not matter whether the sanctions fall upon the 
individuals or the corporation. But if there is a separation between ownership and 
management, the personal motives of managers must be considered in evaluating the 
effectiveness of sanctions. The simpler versions of optimal deterrence theory assume that there 
are no principal-agent divergences and that the managers are risk-neutral. However, it 
sometimes is true that the reward structures of traditional executive compensation contracts 
typically give short-term, personal enrichment a greater weight than the long-run interests of 
stockholders. 
If the profits generated by price fixing generate immediate personal rewards for such 
managers, but long-term losses for shareholders (incurred only after years of litigation, when 
the managers may no longer be with the corporation) then the optimal ratio of sanctions to 
illegal profits must be higher than for a proprietorship. Similarly, a higher ratio will be required 
if managers are risk-seeking in their corporate decision making rather than risk-averse. For 
these reasons, our focus on corporate-level performance in the present paper is, at best, a rather 
imperfect surrogate for stockholder control, managerial risk aversion, and other factors that, if 
we were able to derive the necessary parameters, we would otherwise incorporate. 
40 "The Division does say that it is focused on both hammering corporations with big fines 
and sending their price-fixing executives to jail. But the reality is that, despite vehement 
Division protestations to the contrary, a key element of the Division's enforcement approach 
appears to be a willingness to trade people (particularly senior executives) for money." TEFFT 
w. SMITH, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, COMMENTS FOR THE ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION 
COMMISSION HEARING ON CRIMINAL ANTITRUST REMEDIES 5 (2005), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdfISmith_Statement.pdf. 
41 The only other nations we know of that have imprisoned antitrust violators at least once 
are Great Britain, Israel, Germany, Japan, and Ireland, but they have only done so on relatively 
rare occasions. Canada and other jurisdictions impose prison sentences but convert them to 
non-custodial sanctions. See Connor, supra note 14. However, the international trend is 
towards greater use of incarceration for cartelists. [d. 
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systematic evidence proving the deterrent effects of sanctions on 
individuals, and/or assessing whether such sanctions can be justified."42 
Moreover, an interesting set of criticisms was leveled at the DOJ's 
imprisonment policies at a hearing of the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission. Tefft Smith, a prominent U.S. antitrust lawyer who often 
represents defendants, testified that, in his experience, imprisonment is 
the DOT's "biggest (and most effective) stick" in cartel enforcement.43 
Nevertheless, he criticized the DOJ for offering unduly short sentences44 
and because-with exceptions45-the DOJ tends to prosecute mid-level 
sales or marketing executives rather than the most senior responsible 
officers of the company.46 To the extent this is true,47 it seriously 
42 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., Overview to POLICY ROUNDTABLES: CARTEL 
SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS, 2003, at 1 (2005) [hereinafter CARTEL SANCTIONS], 
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/cartelsandanti-competitiveagreementsl 
34306028.pdf. 
43 Smith, supra note 40, at 7-10. 
44 Id. 
45 For example, Alfred Taubman, the billionaire Chairman of Sotheby's, was sentenced to a 
year and a day in prison in conjunction with the auction houses bid rigging case. See The 
World's Billionaires, #655 A. Alfred Taubman, FORBES.COM (Mar. 10,2010), http://www.forbes. 
com!lists/2010/10/billionaires-2010_A-Alfred-Taubman_LWZ4.html. Taubman "entered a 
low-security medical prison in Rochester, Minnesota, on August 1, 2002 and, after having his 
sentence reduced for good behavior, was released on May 15 2003." Jill Treanor, Taubmans 
Lose Hold on Sotheby's: Auction House Ends Family's Grip on 62% of Voting Rights, GUARDIAN, 
Sept. 9, 2005, at 18. 
As of February 2011, Taubman was alive and doing well. The day after Taubman was 
sentenced, the Board of Directors of Sotheby's Holdings Inc. at a "thinly attended annual 
meeting" elected Taubman to be a member of the Board, and his son Robert replaced him as 
Chairman. A Taubman Continues to Sit on Sotheby's Board, NAT'L POST (CANADA), Apr. 25, 
2002, at FP2. In addition to positions on other corporate boards, as of 2010 he was a Trustee of 
the Urban Land Institute. Profile Detail-A. Alfred Taubman, MARQUIS WHO'S WHO 2010, 
http://search.marquiswhoswho.com/profile/100004075742 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) 
(registration required). 
His re-emergence into society may have begun in Detroit in 2005, when he accepted the 
first lifetime achievement award from the Detroit chapter of the Urban Land Institute. 
Taubman to be Honored, CRAIN'S DETROIT Bus., Apr. 4, 2005, at 8. Moreover, his social life has 
revived. "Today we are living at the dawn of the ultra-mega-uber-monster book party, 
celebrations so huge and elaborate that you might think you were at a wedding .... In April, 
400 guests celebrated Alfred Taubman's book, Threshold Resistance: The Extraordinary Career 
of a Luxury Retailing Pioneer . .. at the Four Seasons." Alex Kuczynski, Comped Lit, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, § 6 (T: Women's Fashion Magazine), at 226. Louis Auchincloss, novelist 
and chronicler of New York City mores, was quoted as saying "in amazement" that Taubman 
"comes out of jail and he's just as popular and giving as many parties as he ever did! There's no 
disgrace in going to jail anymore unless it's for some disgusting, disgusting crime." Larissa 
MacFarquhar, East Side Story: How Louis Auchincloss Came to Terms with His World, NEW 
YORKER, Feb. 25, 2008, at 54. In addition, Taubman's name will remain forever on several 
bUildings on the campuses of Harvard, Brown, and the University of Michigan. Ariana Eunjung 
Cha, Corporate Scandals Tainting Donations, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2002, at Al. 
46 Tefft Smith wrote: 
First, the individuals typically carved-out in the corporate plea agreements (which 
give a pass on prosecution, assuming cooperation with any Division investigative 
requests, to all but the "carve-outs") tend to be mid-level sales and marketing 
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undermines the overall effectiveness of prison as a way to prevent 
cartelization. Therefore, we attempted to track down the past and 
present positions of executives imprisoned for criminal price fixing. 
Of the 152 known individuals who received a fine or prison 
sentence in cartel cases between 1990 and 2008, we48 were able to 
determine the position held during the cartel's existence for 151 of 
them. 49 Of those, 40 appear to have been one of the heads of the 
companies for which they worked;50 24 appear to have occupied a 
corporate position that was very high, but below the level of those in the 
former group;51 77 appear to have been mid-level employees; 3 were co-
owners or sole-proprietors of a business; 3 were stamp dealers; and 4 
were consultants. 52 Of the mid-level employees, 35 were dearly involved 
in sales or marketing. 53 
Still, another problem arises from the fact that some of the 
corporations involved forgive or even reward their price-fixing 
employees-directly or indirectly, legally or not-after they "take a 
bullet for the team" by going to prison. 54 Although it is difficult to 
executives with "direct participation" or "knowledge" and "an ability to stop" the 
price-fixing. They tend not to be the senior executives, even when sometimes (in the 
Division's view) the senior executives are said by the Division to have been "willfully 
ignorant" of the misconduct. 
Smith, supra note 40, at 9. 
47 "And so it has always been true, and I am sure it is still true, that at the end of the day 
you're not going to get-it is very rare to get-the big multinational or national large 
corporation CEO or top guy as your antitrust defendant." Nanni, supra note 8, at 39. 
48 W. James Denvil, What Happens to Executives Who Are Sanctionedfor Their Involvement 
in Cartels? (on file with the author) available at http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/34-
2/Connor.Lande.34.2/DenviiStudy.pdf. This research was conducted by w. James Denvil while 
he was a student at the University of Baltimore School of Law. He is not a trained private 
investigator. He conducted his searches between July 15, 2010, and March 26, 2011, using 
Google, Bing, Linkedln, Facebook, corporate websites, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
Inmate Locator. He searched for the individuals by using their full names, variants of those 
names, the names of their employers, descriptions of their cartels, the dates of their convictions, 
and the recent years (Le., 2007-2010) as search terms. Because he could only rely upon public 
data, much of which could be unreliable, this survey should be regarded as extremely tentative, 
and only suggestive of what the actual results are likely to be. We urge others to conduct a more 
rigorous analysis of this issue. 
49 However, job titles can be misleading and may not accurately reflect an individual's true 
position in the company. 
50 See Denvil, supra note 48. This group is comprised of individuals with the title of 
Chairperson, President, Owner, Co-owner, Managing Director (of a European company), CEO, 
orCOO. 
5l See id. This group is comprised of individuals with the title of Commercial General 
Manager, Operations Manager, Director, Executive Vice President, President (of a division 
within the company), Managing Director (of a division within the company), Vice President of 
Operations, Commercial Director, CFO, or Co-Managing Director. 
52 See id. This group consists of the individuals not included in the former two groups. 
53 See id. These individuals have the words "sales," "marketing," or "development" in their 
titles. 
54 See Dan Levine, Antitrust Convictions Don't Mean End of Job for Some Executives, 
RECORDER, Apr. 12, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202447903832&rss= 
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determine when or whether it would be legal, 55 the authors would not be 
surprised if it were common for the corporations involved to pay their 
executives' fines directly or indirectly in the form of bonuses or 
promotions. 56 
We attempted to discover how often convicted corporations 
forgive, and even reward, employees who violate the antitrust laws, and 
believe the results show that it may be common. We were able to 
determine the present whereabouts of 35 (34%) out of 103 managers57 
known to have received a prison sentence in cartel cases between 1995 
and 2010.58 Of those 35, 9 (26%) are currently employed by the 
company for which they worked during the cartel, and another 9 (26%) 
seem to be working at a different company within the same industry. 59 
The remaining 17 are either in prison, unemployed, employed in 
different industries, or deceased.60 Because we were unable to discover 
the whereabouts of 68 of the 103 who received a prison sentence, these 
results might not be statistically significant. Nevertheless, if the 
employment statistics of the out-of-sample price fixers resembles those 
of the known ones, approximately half of those who served a prison 
newswire (describing an executive who was sent to prison for six months for price fixing, and 
when released, was made a senior vice president "with more responsibility than he had before 
he entered prison .... "). One reason for this may be that "since the executives are not 
perceived to have ripped off shareholders for personal gain, companies often have no problem 
welcoming them back into their corporate suites .... [S)ome corporate honchos believe 
executives that pleaded guilty took a bullet for the team, according to white-collar lawyers and 
industry observers." Id. Indeed, they have in all likelihood enriched the stockholders because 
the penalty their conduct led to probably was too low. 
There are also reports that some companies continue to pay employees while they are in 
prison. Id. In the opinion of Tefft Smith the Antitrust Division does not get involved in 
employment decisions: 
[I)n my experience, the Division appears indifferent as to what the companies do 
with even the carved-out individuals (let alone the other executives who may have 
been identified as having been directly involved in the price-fixing). They need not 
be fired, disciplined or even re-assigned to non-sales and marketing-oriented jobs. 
See Smith, supra note 40, at 10. 
55 See 1 ROGER MAGNUSON, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION § 9:37 (2010); see also Pamela H. 
Bucey, Indemnification of Corporate Executives Who Have Been Convicted of Crimes: An 
Assessment and Proposal, 24 IND. L. REV. 279 (1991); Note, Indemnification of Directors: The 
Problems Posed by Federal Securities and Antitrust Legislation, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1403 (1963). 
56 JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 419-20 (2001) (describing how during cross-
examination at the famous 1998 trial of three top executives of ADM for price fixing, the lead 
(immunized) witness for the prosecution was made to admit that his employer had paid his 
entire fine and promoted him to president of one of its largest subsidiaries). 
57 In several cases, individuals were sanctioned but not their very small businesses. Thus, we 
excluded individuals who were stamp dealers, consultants, sole proprietors, or co-owners 
during the cartel. Many of the 152 defendants' sentencing details are not posted on the 
Antitrust Division's Web site. We thank the Division for providing the missing sentencing 
documents. 
58 See Denvil, supra note 48. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
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sentence for their . crime currently are working for their previous 
employers or in the same industry.61 
We were also able to discover the current whereabouts of four 
people who received fines, but no prison sentence during the period 
between 1995 and 2009.62 Two of them are employed by the same 
company for which they worked during the cartel, one appears to be 
working in the same industry, and the other is working in another 
industry. 63 
Indeed, for executives who went to prison, our figure of 52% 
almost certainly significantly underestimates the percentage of price 
fixers who went back to the same firm or industry. Some individuals 
may have reached retirement age, or returned to a firm or industry 
without notice of this fact being published in a source that is easily web-
accessible, or the notice of some individuals' re-employment may have 
been deleted from the Internet prior to July 15,2010.64 Our survey may 
have erroneously counted such people as not having returned to their 
firm or industry. 
The fact that some-perhaps most-corporations do not punish, 
and even reward, the individuals responsible for antitrust violations is 
only one reason why we are not persuaded by the argument that only 
individual sanctions matter. First of all, the financial well-being of the 
affected corporations often do matter to the individuals involved, as 
evidenced by corporate executives who, by fixing prices, often 
knowingly risk imprisonment largely for the financial benefit of their 
employers. Moreover, the literature on antitrust law generally assumes 
that corporations maximize profits, which means it also assumes the 
interests of corporate representatives and corporations generally align.65 
A corporation that truly does not want to break the laws against price-
fixing because of the sanctions involved has any number of means to 
ensure that its employees follow company policy.66 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
64 See generally id. (noting that the research was conducted between July 15, 2010, and 
September 27, 2010). 
65 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at ix (2d ed. 2001) (arguing there is in the 
antitrust field a consensus that "business firms should be assumed to be rational profit 
maximizers, so that the issue in evaluating the antitrust significance of a particular business 
practice should be whether it is a means by which a rational profits maximizer can increase its 
profits at the expense of efficiency" (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574 (1986))). 
66 See Posner, Optimal Sentences, supra note 15, at 418 ("[I]f [the corporation] is liable it 
will find adequate ways of imposing on its employees the costs to it of violating the law."). 
Judge Posner noted: "A corporation has effective methods of preventing its employees from 
committing acts that impose huge [antitrust] liabilities on it. A sales manager whose 
unauthorized participation in a paltry price-fixing scheme resulted in the imposition of a $1 
million fine on his employer would thereafter, 1 predict, have great difficulty finding 
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There are, moreover, a number of practical problems with 
exclusively or heavily relying on prison sentences as a means of 
deterring cartels, particularly international ones. First, it is more 
difficult to persuade managers of cartels who reside abroad to submit to 
U.S. jurisdiction. While indictments of foreign residents have increased, 
improvements in the ability of U.S. authorities to extradite individuals 
for price-fIxing crimes have not kept paceY There are large numbers of 
indicted cartel managers who are fugitives residing abroad.68 Second, 
obtaining convictions of cartel managers who exercise their rights to a 
jury trial and who are within U.S. jurisdiction has proven challenging 
for the DOJ. Prosecutorial losses at trial are frequent.69 Third, the 
demonstration effect of imprisonment requires adequate publicity about 
prison sentences. As the number and length of antitrust prison 
sentences have increased and they have become more routine, the 
"shock and awe" effect may decline. To offset such a trend, the DOJ has 
announced ever tougher standards for incarceration. It is unclear, 
however, whether these have been implemented to a signifIcant extent 
or are mostly bluster. Fourth, coordination among those few antitrust 
authorities who incarcerate executives guilty of global price fIxing is rare 
and likely to remain so in the futureJo Where a cartel's injuries are 
multi-jurisdictional, multiple corporate fInes have become common. 
However, there are no treaties on multiple incarcerations of cartel 
managers, so double-jeopardy concerns may well undermine the 
chances that the overall level of individual sanctions could be optimal. 
The following matrix illustrates some of the issues involving the 
public policy issues underlying decisions to impose individual or 
corporate responsibility: 
responsible employment, and this prospect should be sufficient to deter." POSNER, supra note 
65, at 271. Posner first published this in 1976, when antitrust fines were very low. Since he 
believed corporations had an adequate incentive and means to control its employees when 
faced with prospects of a $1 million fine, a fortiori they would do so when faced with a possible 
$100 million fine. 
67 See Julian M. Joshua, Peter D. Camesaca & Youngjin Jung, Extradition and Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties: Cartel Enforcement's Global Reach, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 353 (2008). 
68 See infra Part IV.B. 
69 See Connor, supra note 14. 
70 See CARTEL SANCTIONS, supra note 42. 
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Table 1 
Optimal Cartel Deterrence: 


























One way to analyze these possibilities is in terms of error analysis. 
Type I error involves problems arising from over-deterrence (this arises 
most in cell 9). Since collusion is judged under a criminal "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard, these errors are likely to be rare and mostly 
theoretical. Nevertheless, from the corporate perspective honest 
behavior can be mistaken for collusion, and this could be costly to 
society because it would cause corporations to refrain from 
procompetitive practices. The resulting fines would be unfair to 
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stockholders and cause over-investment in collusion prevention 
(although the actual costs of compliance programs are likely to be very 
small). From an employee perspective: They face prison and fines for 
honest behavior. But firms can ameliorate this by paying these fines for 
them (legally or illegally,71 directly or indirectly, perhaps through direct 
payments through foreign banks, and/or post-conviction employment). 
Such behavior, to the extent it is not merely theoretical, is inefficient. 
Type II error involves problems from under-deterrence (this arises 
most in cell O. Inadequate sanctions will fail to deter collusion 
optimally. From a corporate perspective: The corporation is unjustly 
enriched from the illegal overcharges. Untold billions of dollars will be 
stolen from U.S. consumers and businesses, often by foreign 
lawbreakers. One study covering just forty private U.S. antitrust cases 
from 1990-2007 documented returned overcharges of more than $18 
billion.72 From an employee perspective: Employee activity that should 
go into productive and competitive behavior, instead, often will be 
directed towards establishing or maintaining collusion, or preventing its 
discovery. Moreover, as noted earlier, collusion also results in allocative 
inefficiency and other inefficiencies. 73 
In addition to Types I and II error, a system of cartel sanctions also 
should consider a third type of error. Type III error occurs when the 
system created to decide the issues leads to increased costs to businesses, 
consumers, enforcers, or decision-makers.74 In the cartel context, these 
costs include litigation expenses by the enforcers, plaintiffs, and 
defendants, and their expert witness costs. It includes the costs arising 
from delays, and also the value of corporate time spent on these issues. 
It also includes the undesirable effects on society arising from any 
increased business uncertainty, and the increased cost to the judicial 
system, which imposes additional costs on taxpayers. Quantitatively, 
Type III error can be significant,75 and any policy that ignores it runs a 
substantial risk of departing from an optimal result. 
71 It is difficult to determine whether the antitrust fines imposed on corporate employees 
are ultimately paid by the employees, or are often or usually directly or indirectly paid by their 
employers. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. It also is difficult to determine whether it 
would be legal for the corporation to pay these fines. This area of law is exceedingly complex 
and, of course, even if indemnification is illegal, this does not mean it does not occur regularly. 
See ROGER MAGNUSON, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION § 9:37 (2010); Bucey, supra note 55; Note, 
supra note 55. 
72 Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private Antitrust Enforcement: An 
Analysis of Forty Cases, 42. U.S.F. L. REv. 879 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm ?abstracUd= 1 090661. 
73 See supra note 22; infra Part IILB. 
74 See Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 
71 CALIF. 1. REv. 1580, 1670-71 (1983), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1684227 (introducing the concept of Type III error; defining and using these 
terms in a related antitrust context: merger enforcement). 
75 [d. 
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We know of no way to secure the information necessary to 
quantify and minimize these errors. Nevertheless, we believe it is likely 
that optimal deterrence only can be secured by a mix of corporate and 
individual sanctions.76 If violations only were subject to corporate 
penalties, individuals might be unduly tempted to form cartels because 
success would benefit them tremendously and, as has been suggested by 
anecdotes77 and some research,78 they often do not face significant 
internal sanctions for their illegal behavior79 and might well even be 
rewarded for their suffering in prison. On the other hand, if only 
individual penalties existed, it could be in the interests of some 
corporations to establish internal incentives that failed to discourage, 
rewarded, or even coerced employees into engaging in illegal behavior. 80 
Some corporations might prefer to offer up a few executives for multi-
year prison terms rather than pay $100 million or more as a criminal 
fine or payout in private litigation.81 The employees could be 
incentivized to risk prison by multi-million dollar bonuses, perhaps paid 
to foreign bank accounts or in the form of future employment. Even 
though these payments might be quite large for individuals, they easily 
could be dwarfed by the prospective fine that could be imposed under a 
regime oriented towards corporate fines. 82 
76 In addition, it is important for a society to create a cultural norm that cartel behavior, 
like stealing, is something that is strongly condemned across that society. It is important that 
the prohibition against price fixing become a moral or social standard that is internalized 
within the business community. Many people refrain from stealing because they think it is the 
right thing to do, not because of the threat of fine or incarceration. Attaching social stigma to 
the act is an important aspect of optimal deterrence. See generally John M. Connor, Albert A. 
Foer & Simcha Udwin, Criminalizing Cartels: An American Perspective, 2010 NEW J. EUR. CR1M. 
LAW 199, available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/filesINJECL%20201O.pdf; 
Andreas Stephan, "The Battle for Hearts and Minds": The Role of the Media in Treating Cartels 
as Criminal, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS: A CRITICAL INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT, supra note 31, at 381, available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracCid=1866285. 
77 See supra notes 56-67. 
78 Khanna, supra note 33, at 1485-86; supra notes 56-67. 
79 Greg Werden suggests additional reasons: "This can occur as a result of defects in the 
design of compensation schemes, especially if the executives have short time horizons or are 
more willing than business enterprises to take risks. Consequently, business enterprises can 
incur substantial costs in monitoring their executives and complying with the law." See 
Werden, supra note 20, at 31-32 (footnotes omitted). 
80 [d. at 32. 
81 Suppose that instead of a corporate fine or payout in private cases a corporation could 
offer up to the DOJ five executives who would each be sentenced to two years in prison or 
under house arrest. Suppose the corporation could pay each of the individuals involved $6 
million per year by depositing the appropriate sums in Swiss bank accounts, and also guarantee 
they would return to their position in the company upon release. This would only cost the 
corporation $60 million, far less than many of the larger fines that have been imposed in recent 
years, and far less than many of the private payouts of recent years. 
82 Perhaps in part because corporations often would be able to compensate the punished 
individuals who "took one for the team," the "rogue manager" defense rarely has been accepted 
by the Antitrust Division or by the courts. 
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We certainly do not know how to devise a formula to compare 
alternative cartel sanctions. Nevertheless, it is our judgment that a 
financial penalty against an individual has more of an impact on 
deterrence than a similar penalty against a corporation, and that prison 
time or the loss of one's corporate position83 often is the equivalent of a 
very large financial penalty. We make accommodations for these 
assumptions in our analysis in Part III by tripling the disvalue or 
deterrence effects of individual sanctions relative to corporate sanctions. 
II. THE OVERALL LEVELS OF CURRENT CARTEL SANCTIONS 
Violations of the U.S. antitrust laws can result in a diverse array of 
criminal sanctions. These include corporate fines and restitution 
payments, as well as prison, house arrest, and fines for the corporate 
officials involved. During the 1990 to 2010 period the total amount of 
corporate fines imposed in every DOJ criminal antitrust case was $6.174 
billion.84 The total of the individual antitrust fines imposed was $74 
million.85 The Antitrust Division also secured the restitution of $165 
million in conjunction with criminal antitrust cases86 (which largely or 
totally consisted of restitution to the federal government for overcharges 
it paid),87 Its enforcement also resulted in sentences against 367 
individuals88 that total 186,393 days (510 years) in prison.89 Antitrust 
enforcement also led to another 112 years of "house arrest or 
83 Donald Kiawiter, an extremely experienced practitioner and former Chair of the ABA 
Antitrust Section, at the American Antitrust Institute's Annual Conference, held on June 23, 
2011, in Washington, D.C., noted during the session on international cartels: 
From my experience in representing corporations and their executives in these cases, 
two things terrify executives. The first is the possibility that they will go to jail, if even 
for a week. And the second is that they will ... lose their high level positions in 
corporations. Indeed, I've had some confess that taking them out of the CEO job or 
the head of sales job is much more traumatic to them than spending a year and a half 
in jail. That's sort of an interesting rationale and I think an interesting fact that we 
should look at. 
Donald Klawiter, Partner, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, International Cartels 
Presentation at American Antitrust Institute Annual Conference (June 23, 2011) (audio 
available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/international-cartels-presentation-and-
audio-aai-annual-conference). 
84 See WORKLOAD STATISTICS 2002-2011, supra note 25, at 11. The yearly figures are 
reproduced and summed in Lande & Davis, supra note 14, at 33 tbl.1. 
85 ld. The yearly figures are reproduced and summed in Lande & Davis, supra note 14, at 34 
tb1.2. 
86 ld. at 12. The yearly figures are reproduced and summed in Lande & Davis, supra note 
14, at 35 tbl.3. 
87 As the Division's Workload Statistics notes with considerable understatement, 
"Frequently restitution is not sought in criminal antitrust cases, as damages are obtained 
through treble damage actions filed by the victims." ld. at 12 n.ls. 
88 ld. at 12. 
89 ld. 
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confinement to a halfway house or community treatment center" for 
262 individuals.9o 
Now, we turn to civil sanctions secured by private plaintiffs. Cartel 
victims receive mandatory treble damages and attorneys' fees. 91 Final 
verdicts in cartel cases are exceptionally rare, however. Our 2004 search 
for every final verdict in a U.S. cartel case since 1890 found only twenty-
five examples.92 Nevertheless, many private cases have resulted in 
significant settlements. An analysis of well over 100 international cartels 
prosecuted between 1990 and 2008 found a total of $29 billion in 
announced private settlements in U.S. cases.93 The only other estimate 
we have found was for a very limited sample of twenty-five large private 
cases filed against cartels between 1990 and 2007, which documented 
between $9.2 billion and $lO.6 billion in cash payments (not including 
the value of products, coupons, or discounts).94 
90 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 
1990-1999, at 13 (2009) [hereinafter WORKLOAD STATISTICS 1990-1999]' available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/246419.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE., ANTITRUST DIVISION 
WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2000-2009, at 14 (2012) [hereinafter WORKLOAD STATISTICS 2000-
2009], available at http://www.justice.gov!atr!public!281484.pdf; WORKLOAD STATISTICS 2002-
2011, supra note 25, at 12. However, these figures might be too high for the purposes at hand, 
for two reasons. First, these figures are for time sentenced, not time served. We were unable to 
determine how much of this time actually was served or how often sentences were reduced. For 
example, A. Alfred Taubman was sentenced to prison for a cartel offense for twelve months, but 
only served nine-and-a-half months. See note 45 supra. 
Second, sometimes an investigation by the Antitrust Division results in a sentence for 
another crime regardless of whether an antitrust violation was uncovered. Non-price-fixing 
crimes can include perjury, mail fraud, contempt, obstruction of justice, and false statements. 
WORKLOAD STATISTICS 2002-2011, supra note 25, at 8 (listing these crimes under the header 
"Other Criminal Cases"). Since the Antitrust Division uncovered these crimes, often Antitrust 
Division investigators are in the best position to pursue these non-antitrust issues. Most often, 
these other crimes are related to an antitrust offense-such as when a cartel bribes a federal 
purchasing agent. Other times they are not related, and quite often, they are very difficult to 
classify. According to the Antitrust Division, "Other Federal Crimes such as Perjury, Mail 
Fraud, Contempt, Obstruction of justice, or False Statements" apparently constituted 36% of 
their criminal convictions since 1990 (53% during 2008-2009). 
We do not, however, know how many of the 186,393 days of prison secured by Antitrust 
Division enforcement were imposed for crimes that were not antitrust related. Ideally, we 
would subtract these before we conduct our optimal deterrence analysis. For lack of data, and 
to be conservative, we are ignoring these issues. The figures reported above for prison time and 
house arrest, therefore, will be used in our subsequent analysis even though they include some 
individuals serving time in whole or in part for non-antitrust offenses. And, as noted, these are 
time sentenced, not time served statistics. Because these statistics are larger than they should be 
for our purposes, their use will overestimate the probable deterrence effect of the DOl's anti-
cartel program. 
91 Prevailing plaintiffs also receive filing fees and expert witness fees. See supra note 5. 
92 See Connor & Lande, supra note 14. 
93 john M. Connor, Cartels & Antitrust Portrayed: Private International Cartels from 1990 
to 2008, at 51 (American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 09-062009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1467310. 
94 Since almost all these cases were settlements, "alleged victims" would usually be a more 
accurate description. See Lande & Davis, supra note 14. These figures have not been adjusted 
for inflation. These cartel payouts constituted a part of a larger study of forty private cases that 
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We have aggregated all of these types of cartel sanctions and we 
now analyze them according to the standard optimal deterrence model. 
First, we have assembled the financial penalties imposed on 
corporations, including the amounts they pay in corporate fines, 
restitution actions, and private treble damages actions. 95 Second, we 
have assembled the fines imposed on the individual corporate actors 
who were held personally responsible for cartel violations. Third, we 
developed monetary equivalents of time in prison (or time spent under 
house arrest) by approximating the disvalue, cost, deterrent value, or 
opportunity cost of incarceration time. 96 Admittedly, establishing the 
likely disincentive effect of prison in an objective, accurate, and non-
documented a total of $18-19.6 billion returned to victims or alleged victims of antitrust 
violations. Id. 
95 There are three additional types of monetary costs that we have not been able to quantify. 
First, antitrust suits are costly to defend. The amounts antitrust defendants pay in attorneys' 
fees usually are confidential, however, and we know of no way to systematically estimate them. 
One could assume they are equal in size to the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, which are matters of 
public record in class action cases, and then include them in the calculations. We do not know, 
however, whether this would be a close approximation. Second, antitrust suits cause corporate 
disruption and wasted time for the corporate executives involved. We know of no method to 
evaluate this type of corporate loss. Third, an antitrust conviction could harm a company's 
reputation and cost it business, and could decrease an individual's future income and lower 
their reputation and social status. We know of no way, however, to quantify such losses. In 
addition, society must pay to incarcerate people. We believe this cost is relatively small. 
Regardless, our decision to triple the $2 million "cost" of a year in prison should more 
than cover adjustments that should be made for these factors. 
96 Note the important difference in these two baselines: corporate actors might demand a 
different sum to risk prison than they would be willing to pay to avoid the risk of prison. For 
example, suppose someone would rather pay a $6 million fine than be imprisoned for a year. 
How would that person react to the question of whether they would accept $6 million in return 
to going to prison for a year? They might not agree to this deal. Part of the difference is the 
relative wealth of the actor in the two situations. A corporate actor could in theory demand an 
unlimited amount to accept the risk of prison, and any such payment increases his or her 
wealth. But the same person cannot pay an unlimited amount to avoid the risk of prison; she 
can only spend as much money as she has or can borrow. See David Cohen & Jack L. Knetsch, 
Judicial Choice and Disparities Between Measures of Economic Values, in CHOICES, V AWES, 
AND FRAMES 424, 428 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). 
But there is another element at play here as well. Empirical evidence shows that people's 
attitude toward costs and benefits depend on their perception of the status quo. Id. at 428-29. A 
person who accepts prison as the status quo may be willing to pay less to avoid it than a person 
who sees prison as a deviation from the status quo. A corollary is that, depending on the odds 
and stakes, people value avoiding losses-and are willing to take risks to do so-far more than 
they value gains, which they generally will not take risks to do (although, oddly, this principle 
may vary depending on the odds of the risk and the size of the gain or loss). See Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, 
supra at 1, 35-36. This psychological phenomenon-and others-greatly complicates an 
economic analysis of behavior. So, for example, a corporate actor who perceives herself as 
taking steps that violate the antitrust law to return to the status quo (perhaps because she thinks 
her corporation is suffering from unfair competition) may be far more tolerant of risk than the 
same corporate actor who contemplates the same measure as a means of obtaining a perceived 
economic advantage. Even for a single corporate actor, then, there may be no single correct 
amount that represents her willingness to trade off between gain for her corporation and the 
risk of prison for herself. 
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controversial manner is impossible. Because our attempt to monetize 
incarceration is a relatively novel feature of this Article, we allocate the 
major part of this Section to this topic. 
Some might contend that, because no corporate officer wants to 
spend any time in prison or under house arrest, they would be willing to 
pay virtually any amount of money to avoid the risk of prison. This is 
equivalent to placing an infinite (negative) value on prison time, and it 
implies that even a small probability of spending any time in prison or 
under house arrest has an infinite deterrence value. However, people do 
not act as if they infinitely disvalue the risk of getting put into prison or 
placed under house arrest for an antitrust offense. If they did, they 
would never try to form a cartel because this would put them at risk of 
going to prison. Rather, potential offenders act as if they tolerate the risk 
of prison to some extent. Perhaps they calculate, implicitly, on the basis 
of legal advice and what they have heard from other executives, their 
apparent chances of getting caught and convicted, and the prison 
sentence, house arrest, or fine they are likely to face, at least to some 
very rough degree. 97 They then balance this chance of a penalty and its 
likely size, again in an extremely rough way, against the rewards of 
cartelization. In any case, we know that often they decide to form 
cartels. We know they often make this decision because cartelists surely 
know cartels are illegal, yet the number of cartels caught in recent years 
has been quite significant and does not seem to be decreasing. 98 
Since the disutility of prison time is not infinite, in theory we can 
approximate its value, though to do so in practice is, of course, difficult 
and speculative. There is no one objective way to compare the 
deterrence effect of time spent in prison to the deterrence effect of a 
criminal fine because different people would trade off prison versus 
fines in different ways. Any "average" figure used to equate the two is 
necessarily imprecise and arbitrary. 
The valuation .of custodial time is similar to one that, regrettably, 
society often must undertake for any number of public policy purposes. 
Sometimes even a life must be valued finitely. For example, our nation 
cannot afford perfect safety, nor would we want every automobile to be 
built as safely as technically possible.99 Similarly, even though a life is 
beyond value and society does not want people to drive negligently, 
courts do not award infinite damages for the loss of life in car crashes. 
97 As noted earlier, direct or indirect payments of fines or rewards for imprisonment by 
their employers might sometimes also be a factor. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
98 See supra note 26. 
99 If society did this, it would be forced to accept increased risks from other sources (i.e., 
society cannot afford perfect safety). 
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We present five different approaches to the issue of how to evaluate 
the cost or value of time in prison. 100 We expect that considering the use 
of multiple approaches will increase the reliability of our results. 
The first approach is to ascertain the valuations of lives and years 
of life used for various regulatory, public policy purposes. 101 In the 
United States, lives typically are valued at between $3 million and $10 
million by federal government agencies when they set, for example, 
transportation or environmental policy.l02 Some of these studies are 
especially appropriate for our purposes because they place average 
values on a year of life. They generally calculate figures of $300,000 to 
$500,000 per person per year of life (depending upon a number of 
variables). 103 
Second, lower figures on average, from $1.4 million to $3.8 million 
for a life, are awarded under tort law, in wrongful death cases. 104 
Third, following the September 11 th tragedy, Congress created the 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund to award compensation to 
victims' families. lOS The Fund's payments constitute a prominent recent 
reflection of the monetary value our society places on innocent human 
life, even though these payouts were made under unique circumstances. 
The Fund's average award for a life was $2,937,861, the median award 
was $1,677,632, the maximum award was $7,100,000, and the minimum 
award was $250,000. 106 Significantly for our purposes, many of the 
September 11 victims had been quite affluent. Eighty-nine of the victims 
had annual incomes between $500,000 and $1,000,000 per year (their 
estates were given average awards of $4,749,654), and eight victims' 
100 These presented approaches have been adapted from Lande & Davis, supra note 14, at 
14-19. 
101 For a concise essay on economic methods for evaluating "statistical lives," see Thomas C. 
Schelling, Value of Life, in 4 THE NEW PALGRA VE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 793-96 (John 
Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). 
102 See Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Adjusting the Value of a Statistical Life for Age and 
Cohort Effects, 90 REv. OF ECON. & STAT. 573 (2008). Recently, the Department of 
Transportation has used $5.8 million for the value of a life. Memorandum from Tyler D. 
Duvall, Assistant Sec'y for Transp. Policy, and D. J. Gribbin, Gen. Counsel, to Secretarial 
Officers & Modal Adm'rs (Feb. 5, 2008), available at http://ostpxweb.ost.dot.gov/policy/ 
reports/080205.htm. The Environmental Protection Agency currently uses $6.9 million. All 
Things Considered: Value on Life 11 Percent Lower Than 5 Years Ago (NPR radio broadcast July 
11,2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=92470116. 
103 See Aldy & Viscusi, supra note 102. For example, values typically decline with age, and 
we note that most price fIxers are mature businessmen. [d. 
104 See Mark A. Cohen & Ted R. Miller, "Willingness to Award" Nonmonetary Damages and 
the Implied Value of Life from Jury Awards, 23 INT'L REv. 1. & ECON. 165, 166, 179 (2003) 
(calculations made in 1995 dollars). 
105 See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001, Pub. 1. No. 107-42, 
115 Stat. 230 (codifIed at 49 U.S.c. § 40101 (2006» [hereinafter "the Act"]. We are grateful to 
Thomas Weaver for his research involving the September 11 th Victim Compensation Fund. 
106 1 KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., FINAL REpORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE 
SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIMS COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 110 tb1.l2 (2001), available at 
http://www.justice.govlfinal_report.pdf. 
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annual income exceeded $4,000,000 per year (their estates were given 
average awards of $6,379,287).107 Although we do not know the average 
or typical pre-conviction annual incomes of imprisoned price fIxers, we 
would not be surprised if the latter income levels are comparable. 
A disadvantage of these first three approaches is that they address 
the cost or dis utility oflost lives, not time spent in prison. It is likely that 
most people would view the prospect of spending a year in prison as not 
as bad as losing a year of life; after all, many prisoners with no chance at 
parole still resist the death penalty. Thus, the fIrst three approaches may 
be regarded as an upper bound on the disutility of a year in prison. 
A fourth method for approximating the disvalue of incarceration 
comes from examining the compensation provided to defendants who 
have been wrongly imprisoned. Sometimes people are wrongly 
imprisoned by, for example, perjured government testimony,lOB The 
victims potentially can recover for a variety of torts depending upon the 
jurisdiction.109 Often no award will be given for imprisonment due to a 
simple, albeit tragic, error; some type of intentional act, malice, or 
malfeasance typically is required. 110 The highest payment we found for a 
case involving at least a year of prison was $1.164 million per year, for 
three years of wrongful confInement for a false conviction. III However, 
when shorter imprisonments are annualized, signifIcantly higher awards 
sometimes have been made.ll2 
107 Id. at 97 tbl.6. 
108 See Limone v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 143, 152 (D. Mass. 2007) (stating the FBI 
was aware chief witness would perjure himself); see also Newsome v. McCabe 319 F.3d 301, 
304-05 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating the officers induced eyewitnesses to falsely identify plaintiff); 
Bravo v. Giblin, No. B125242, 2002 WL 31547001 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2002) (unpublished) 
(stating the investigating officer fabricated evidence). 
The authors are grateful to Thomas Weaver for locating and analyzing these cases, and for 
performing research on this subject. See Thomas Weaver, The Part That Counts: Wrongful 
Incarceration Awards and the Value of Human Life (May 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the authors). 
109 These torts include wrongful imprisonment, wrongful conviction, wrongful confinement, 
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, false arrest, or an unconstitutional depravation of their civil rights. See Weaver, supra 
note 108. 
110 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 108. 
III Bravo, 2002 WL 31547001, at *24. The suit, filed under 42 U.S.c. § 1983, yielded 
"damages in the amount of $221,976 for his economic losses, $3,537,000 to compensate him for 
1179 days of incarceration at the rate of $3000 per day, and $1 million to compensate him for 
emotional distress suffered between the date of the incident and the date of his sentencing." Id. 
We arrived at the award per year of imprisonment of $1,164,515.62 in this case by the following 
steps: 1) multiplying $3,000 a day by 365.25 days to arrive at $1,095,750; 2) the lost earnings of 
$221,976, divided by 1179 days in prison comes to $188.27 per day, and when multiplied by 
365.25 days, adds another $68,765.62 per year. The total award per year of imprisonment thus 
comes to $1,164,515.62. 
112 The extreme case was Ramirez v. County of Los Angeles, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1215 (C.D. 
Cal. 2005) (noting that the investigating officer fabricated evidence). See Rob McKay, Verdict of 
the Week: US Dist. Ct., Los Angeles, VERDICTSEARCH, Mar. 13, 2006, at 21, available at 
http://www.kkcomcon.com/doc/Ramirez%20v%20LAPD.VS.pdf (reporting that a ten month 
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We should note that we have not been able to ascertain any of the 
falsely imprisoned defendants' incomes, but we suspect most had 
relatively low incomes, and none appears to have been a corporate 
executive or upper class professional. ll3 It is possible that a jury or judge 
would award a corporate executive wrongfully imprisoned for price 
fIxing a larger-than-average amount for their suffering. Alternatively, a 
jury might react in the opposite direction. A jury might be less 
sympathetic to imprisoned upper class corporate executives. Still, these 
results do tend to show that compensation in the neighborhood of $1 
million per year appears generally to be the practical maximum that 
society is willing to award for a year wrongfully spent in prison. 
Our fIfth and fInal approach is to examine estimates of the disvalue 
of prison time made by reputable scholars. We have been able to find 
only two estimates for an antitrust offense that seem plausible in this 
context. 114 First, an Article by Professors Howard P. Marvel and others 
equated a year in prison for price fIxing to approximately $600,000 in 
2010 dollars.1l5 Second, a study by Professor Kenneth Glenn Dau-
Schmidt and others equated a year in prison for price fIxing with a fIne 
of approximately $1.5 million in 2010 dollars. 116 These fIgures are higher 
sentence led to a $9 million settlement, or an annual rate of $10,800,000). Because the 
emotional stress and discomfort could be disproportionately high for the very fact of the 
government malfeasance, or greater for the beginning of a prison sentence, it is unclear whether 
the award would have been increased proportionately if the victim had been imprisoned for a 
year, or for multiple years. As noted, in these cases, moreover, it is difficult to segregate the 
amounts awarded for false imprisonment from the amounts awarded for one-time events or 
other torts. "Where the period of incarceration is shorter (e.g., less than one year), 
proportionately larger awards (measured by annualizing the award) have been rendered, 
presumably reflecting Limone's observation that the injury from incarceration may be more 
intense towards the beginning." Smith v. City of Oakland, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1242 (N.D. Cal. 
2008); see also John Collins Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View 
of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 419, 431 (1980) ("[TJhe declining 
marginal utility of imprisonment means that each increment of incarceration increases the 
perceived penalty by a less than proportionate amount. Or, reduced to its simplest terms, a two-
year prison term is not twice as bad as a one-year term."). 
113 See Lande & Davis, supra note 14. 
114 We have found one other estimate, but it seems to value prison time at a level too low to 
apply to white-collar criminals. See Tonja Jacobi & Gwendolyn Carroll, Acknowledging Guilt: 
Forcing Self-Identification in Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 263, 283 & n.52 
(2008) (estimating value of prison at approximately $200 per day, which amounts to slightly 
more than $70,000 per year). 
115 See Howard P. Marvel et al., Price Fixing and Civil Damages: An Economic Analysis, 40 
STAN. L. REv. 561, 573 (1988). The authors equated a year in prison with a $373,000 fine. The 
Article appeared in the February 1988 issue, so we assume they were using 1987 dollars. The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index inflation calculator equates $373,000 in 1987 
to approximately $677,000 in 2011. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Sept. 2,2012). 
116 Joseph c. Gallo et al., Criminal Penalties Under the Sherman Act: A Study of Law and 
Economics, in 16 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 25 (Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. ed., 1994). 
Gallo's Article equated a year in jail with a fine of $1 million. The Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Consumer Price Index inflation calculator equates $1 million in 1994 with $1,486,000 in 2011. 
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than the national average valuations for a year of life noted earlier, 
perhaps because price fixers are wealthier on average and can afford to 
disvalue prison time much more than most people can, or perhaps 
because price fixers' time is more valuable on average. Il7 
These five approaches yield estimates that are broadly consistent 
with one another. To be conservative, we have taken the highest of these 
estimates, $1.5 million per year, and increased it to $2 million (in 2010 
dollars). We note that $2 million is as much as the lower estimates for 
the value of an entire human life that were discussed earlier, and is 
much higher than the average annual national values oflife. 
As discussed earlier, penalties directed against individuals might 
well have more deterrence effect than penalties directed against the 
corporations. To attempt to take this into account, and in an attempt to 
be conservative in our analysis, lIB we have trebled the deterrence effect 
of every individual penalty before adding them to the corporate 
penalties. This means we will use $6 million (in 2010 dollars) for the 
deterrence value of a year in prison. 119 We also will treble the individual 
fines paid in antitrust cases before we add these figures to the corporate 
fines, restitution payments, and payouts in private damages cases.l 20 
And, although we believe we should use a much lower value for house 
arrest than for prison time (such as $1 million or $3 million per year) for 
simplicity of calculations and to be conservative we will value a year of 
house arrest at $6 million, as well. 
CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 115. The authors, however, used 1982 data for much of 
their paper's analysis. If they meant their valuation of a year in jail to be expressed in 1982 
dollars, their $1 million estimate would be the equivalent of approximately $2,282,000 in 2011. 
Id. 
117 Whether the time or the life of a price fixer is more, or less, valuable than that of an 
average person is an interesting philosophical question this Article will not explore. 
118 See also the factors listed in notes 96-97, supra. The incremental $4 million per year 
should more than compensate for these factors as well. 
119 We note that valuing a year's worth of life at $6 million would mean that a twenty year 
prison sentence would be disvalued at $120 million, a figure far in excess of the amount society 
places on an individual's life. 
We will use the $6 million valuation, in 2011 dollars, for the deterrence produced by a year 
spent in prison for price fixing even if that imprisonment occurred years ago. 
We recomputed our analysis using different values for time spent in prison, such as $12 
million per year, but this made no significant difference in our results. See infra note 250, which 
shows that only valuing a year in prison in the range of $1 billion would make a significant 
difference in our results. 
120 This assumes that price fixers actually pay their own fines. It is, however, difficult to 
determine whether antitrust fines imposed on corporate employees ultimately are paid by the 
employees, or are often or usually directly or indirectly paid by their employer. See supra 
note 71. 
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III. CARTEL HARMS: THE "NET HARMS TO OTHERS" FROM CARTELS 
The standard optimal deterrence formula shows that the total 
amount of cartel sanctions should equal the cartel's "net harm to others" 
divided by the probability of detection and proof of the violation. 121 The 
"net harm to others" from a cartel includes not only its overcharges, but 
also the allocative inefficiencyJ22 produced by its exercise of market 
power. The allocative inefficiency from cartel pricing should be added to 
their overcharges to get a true measure of cartels' "net harms to others." 
In theory, each of these parameters should be an expectation that 
has been individualized for the cartel in question. For each potential 
cartelist we would ascertain what each thought their expected profits 
from cartelization were likely to be,123 what their chances of getting 
caught and convicted were, and the total disvalue to them of the 
sanctions they thought would be imposed. This calculus would be made 
with due regard for how much each prospective cartel manager was 
risk-averse or risk-seeking.l 24 As a practical matter, of course, 
ascertaining these required figures is impossible. The best we can do is 
to calculate what each figure actually has been on average in the past, 
and to assume that this figure is likely to be close to what the managers 
of potential cartels believe is likely to happen in the future. This is, of 
course, a highly imperfect exercise. Nevertheless, it is more likely to 
allow us to calculate whether cartel penalties have been set at the 
optimal level than any other approach we can devise. 
A. Cartel Overcharges 
In an earlier Article, we developed and presented a very different 
survey approach. We comprehensively and systematically examined 
cartel overcharges by assembling two data sets. The first consisted of 
scholarly publications containing cartel overcharges. With very few 
exceptions, we attempted to analyze every scholarly study that contained 
quantitative information on the price effects of private cartels. 125 We 
121 See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text. 
122 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Ideally the overcharges also should be adjusted 
upwards for the umbrella effects of market power. Id. Ideally the costs imposed on taxpayers for 
the government to investigate and prosecute and for courts to try cartels, and the costs to the 
public of incarceration, also would be included since they, too, are "net harms to others" from 
cartels. We do not, however, have information as to how large these omitted factors are. 
123 Their expected cartel profits, moreover, would be a distribution of outcomes with 
assigned probabilities. 
124 Another factor would be the opinion of each cartel manager as to their co-conspirators. 
Do they believe their co-conspirators are likely to turn them in under various circumstances? 
125 See Connor & Lande, supra note 14. 
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separately categorized domestic and international cartels from different 
time periods to determine whether the increased penalties of recent 
years have been having significant effects. Our second data source was 
obtained by examining every final verdict in U.S. collusion cases that we 
were able to find. 126 We searched for antitrust cases in which a neutral 
finder of fact reported collusive overcharges in percentage terms or 
presented conclusions that could be converted into an overcharge 
percentage. 
Our most recent compilation from scholarly publications found 
1,517 useful estimates of cartel overcharges or undercharges in more 
than 200 publications that analyzed cartels that operated in 381 
markets. 127 Table 2 displays the medians of all average overcharges 
reported over time. 128 The median cartel overcharge for all types and 
time periods (in a data set that includes a significant number of zeros) is 
23.3%.129 There is no strong trend in the cartel markups for all types 
over time. Indeed, the median since 2000 is virtually the same, 22.5%. 
But if one examines the international cartels separately, it is noteworthy 
that the median over time has been higher than for national cartels 
(30.0% and 17.2%, respectively), but thanks to a downward trend the 
international and national medians since 2000 have been similar (25.8% 
and 20.0%, respectively). 130 The mean overcharge figures have averaged 
49%, much higher than the median figures due to the presence of some 
extremely large overcharges in the sample. 
Our search for verdicts in cartel cases proved to be extremely 
difficult,131 however, because overcharges are not calculated in criminal 
126 Id. at 555-57. 
127 See JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING (2d ed. 2007). 
128 See infra Appendix tbl.2. We choose to show the median overcharge percentages rather 
than the mean overcharge percentages because a few very high overcharges in any particular 
category can overwhelm a mean calculated using the larger number of low-to-medium 
percentage overcharges. 
Another interesting statistic concerns the low number of overcharges by unsuccessful 
cartels. Only about 7% of the data we collected indicated that a cartel episode was unsuccessful 
in controlling prices significandy. We did, of course, include these observations in the median 
calculations that appear in Table 3, infra. 
129 Cartel overcharges might not be passed on to the next level of distribution at the same 
percentage rate. An overcharge of 23.3% by a manufacturer cartel could pass through several 
levels in the distribution chain and result in a final consumer overcharge of more than, or less 
than, 23.3%. 
130 It is difficult to know what to make of the downward trends in profitability for most 
types of cartels. The influence of the spread of, and increase in, effective anticartel enforcement 
is perhaps the most obvious explanation. The downward trend in overcharges among cartels 
that were caught by antitrust authorities tends to support the idea that cartelists find it 
increasingly difficult to hide their activities. Alternatively, the greater antitrust scrutiny in the 
United States from the 1940s and from Europe since the 1960s could prompt cartelists to 
refrain from full monopoly pricing increases so as to reduce their chances of detection. 
131 We looked for cases by the use of computer-assisted searches of databases, searching 
through a large number of articles and treatises on cartels and on antitrust damages, and asking 
groups of knowledgeable antitrust professionals for any examples they knew of that might 
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enforcement against cartels 132 and because almost every private antitrust 
suit for damages settles133 or is dismissed before an overcharge can be 
calculated by a neutral observer and made part of the public record of 
the case. 
As a consequence, final verdicts involving cartels where a judge, 
jury, or commission 134 calculated an overcharge l35 are rare, and we 
found a disappointingly small sample size of cases-twenty-five-to 
analyze. However, our sample is roughly as large as the sizes of the prior 
surveys we report in Table 1 (which were 5-7, 12, 12, 13, 22, and 38 in 
number, respectively). Nevertheless, due to its small size, its results 
should be interpreted with caution. The results of this verdict analysis 
are that the twenty-five collusion episodes had a median average 
overcharge of22%, and a mean overcharge of31%.136 
Thus, our two data sets yield median cartel overcharges of 
approximately 25% and 22% overall. The mean results were 49% for the 
economic studies and 31 % for the verdicts. 137 For the economic studies' 
post-2000 sample, the national and international cartel median 
overcharges averaged 20% and 25.8%.138 These figures will prove 
extremely useful when we formulate our policy recommendations in 
this Article's Conclusion. Part V of this Article, however, which will 
carry out the optimal deterrence calculations according to the standard 
approach, will use the actual amount overcharged by each individual 
cartel. 
B. The Allocative Inefficiency Effects of Market Power 
The "net harms to others" from cartels also include their allocative 
inefficiency effects (oftentimes called the deadweight welfare loss, or 
DWL).139 Unfortunately, we do not know for very many cartels either 
how large their allocative inefficiency harms are or the relative size of a 
cartel's allocative inefficiency compared to its overcharges. We instead 
will select a representative ratio or range that is based on economic 
contain useful information. See Connor & Lande, supra note 14, at 555-56. 
132 Price fixing is illegal regardless whether, or the extent to which, defendant affected prices, 
because the agreement to fix prices is illegal. For this reason the amount that prices changed, or 
even whether prices were affected at all, is not calculated in a criminal antitrust case. Id. at 551. 
133 Id. For a discussion of settlement in this context, and why settlement amounts are likely 
to be an extremely unreliable guide as to the size of the underlying cases' overcharges, see id. 
134 Connor & Lande, supra note 14, at 551-52. 
135 Moreover, many verdicts were only expressed in dollar amounts which we were unable to 
translate into percentages, so we reluctantly had to omit these cases. Id. at 556. 
136 Id. 
137 See id. at 561. The mean figures are significantly higher than the median figures due to 
the effects of extremely high overcharges. 
138 [d. at 541. 
139 For a definition of the allocative inefficiency effects of market power, see supra note 22. 
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theory and constants derived from the empirical literature on cartels 
and monopolies. Then, we will add the DWL to the cartel's overcharges 
when we implement the optimal deterrence calculations. 
As an example of how adding this factor into the optimal 
deterrence calculations could make a difference, Judge Easterbrook, in 
an early paper on this topic, assumed that allocative inefficiency effects 
are 50% as large as overcharges on average,l40 If Judge Easterbrook was 
correct, this would mean that under the "net harm to others" standard, 
every $100 in overcharges would be presumed to be accompanied by 
another $50 in allocative inefficiency harm. 
We located a modest number of technically impressive empirical 
studies specifically about cartels that provide both overcharges and 
DWL estimates. S0lgard computes a DWLlovercharge range of from 
37% to 48% for a Norwegian cement cartel,I41 and Monke et al. find a 
25% ratio for a Portuguese flour cartel. 142 Gallo et al. provide a 
comprehensive analysis of U.S. DOJ cartel cases; they illustrate the DWL 
issue using a 5.3% ratio, but their choice of parameters is not well 
explained. 143 Needless to say, these studies form too small a sample from 
which to generalize. In addition, there are many empirical studies of this 
issue that are concerned with market power in general, not specifically 
with market power resulting from cartels,I44 and one very interesting 
140 See Easterbrook, supra note 23, at 455. From a theoretical standpOint, 50% is in fact the 
maximum possible percentage given a linear demand curve. 
141 Lars S0lgard, Chief Economist, Norwegian Competition Authority, Speech at Seminar 
Hosted by the Norwegian Competition Authority: Cartel Investigations in Norway (Feb. 22, 
2007), available at http://www.konkurransetiisynet.noliKnowBase/Content/425749/070222_ 
LARS_SORGARD.PDF. Four companies were convicted and heavily fined in Norway for fixing 
the prices of corrugated cardboard paper from 1983 to 1990. Id. The decision was sustained on 
appeal to the Supreme Court of Norway. Id. The chief economist of the Competition Authority 
favorably cites an expert opinion (apparently relied upon by the Court) that the overcharge was 
70-80 million NOK and the deadweight loss was 30-40 million NOK. Id. Thus, the ratio was 
from 1.75:1 to 2.67:1. 
142 Erik A. Monke et aI., Welfare Effects of a Processing Cartel: Flour Milling in Portugal, 35 
ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 393, 406 (1987). A careful study of total welfare effects of a 
government-supported cartel found that the ratio of transfer to deadweight losses was 3.6: 1. Id. 
at 405 (18,456 million PTE in consumer transfers and 5150 million PTE in deadweight losses). 
143 Gallo et aI., supra note 116, at 25-71. 
144 See John M. Connor & Everett E. Peterson, New Estimates of Welfare Losses Due to 
Imperfect Competition in U.S. Food Manufacturing, in AGRICULTURAL MARKETS: MECHANISMS, 
FAILURES, REGULATIONS 205 (David Martimort ed., 1996). The authors conclude that ten 
published empirical studies of the food manufacturing industries-employing a variety of data 
sets and methods of analysis-found that the DWL/transfer ratio was 2.5% on average but 
varied from 0.7% to 36%. Id. at 226 tbl.4. Retail food demand elasticities tend to be lower (-0.3 
to -0.7) than elasticities seen in cartelized industries. Id. Five models based on price-leadership 
behavior averaged a relatively low 11 % ratio. Id. However, these studies mostly include 
industries with implicit collusion and some unilateral market power. Id. 
F. M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 667-78 (3d ed.1990), evaluates several empirical estimates of the relative sizes of 
the deadweight loss (0.5 to 2.0% of GNP) and transfer effects (probably at the lower end of the 
range of 3 to 12%) due to the exercise of market power in the whole U.S. economy in the 1950s 
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ratio calculated by the Canadian enforcement authorities in a merger 
case. 145 
Another way to determine the ratio is through the use of economic 
theory and logic. Many textbooks do what Judge Easterbrook did and 
draw diagrams that imply a ratio of 50%, but these usually are heuristic 
illustrations not intended to be realistic representations of markets. 146 
However, economic theory produces a formula for calculating this ratio. 
The DWLltransfer ratio is the long-run, own-price elasticity of demand 
(at the collusive price) multiplied by the overcharge ratio, all of which is 
divided by tWO. 147 That is, DWL is a high share of the income transfer 
when the overcharge is high, and the elasticity is an absolutely large 
number. 
Theory provides some rough guides to appropriate elasticities. We 
know that the elasticity of demand for products that have been 
cartelized is generally elastic (less than -1).148 Following Posner's lead, a 
good range to consider initially is -1.0 to -2.0. 149 But we can do better 
by considering cartel and monopoly studies analyzing good data with 
the most advanced techniqueS.l 50 We will highlight one monopoly and 
five cartel studies. 
to 1970s. Economy-wide analyses tend to produce lower welfare losses than do disaggregated 
industry studies, but the effect on the ratio of interest is uncertain. ld. at 664. Despite the many 
caveats expressed by Scherer and Ross about these numbers, we interpret the average 
DWL/transfer ratio to be roughly 28%. The lowest ratio is perhaps about 8% and the highest 
36%. However, these studies include many industries with implicit collusion and some 
unilateral market power. See id. 
14S See Alan A. Fisher, Robert H. Lande & Stephen F. Ross, Legalizing Merger to Monopoly 
and Higher Prices: The Canadian Competition Tribunal Gets It Wrong, 15 ANTITRUST MAG., no. 
1, Fall 2000, at 71, available at http://papers.ssm.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracCid=1358448. 
The Canadian Competition Tribunal predicted that a proposed propane merger would raise 
prices by 8%, which came to $43 million, and also produce another $3 million in allocative 
inefficiency losses (a 7% ratio). 
146 See, e.g., SCHERER & Ross, supra note 144, at 662. 
147 See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POLIT. ECON. 
807,816 (1975) [hereinafter Posner, Social Costs]. The overcharge ratio is the change in market 
price due to an increase in market power divided by a benchmark or but-for price. ld. Posner 
considers two types of price elasticities, one for linear demand and one for constant demand (a 
concave demand curve). ld. Constant-demand curves are most appropriate for highly 
differentiated products, not for the typical homogeneous products that are cartelized. Thus, we 
adopt the linear-demand-elasticity assumption herein. We also assume that unit costs are 
constant over the relevant range of output. 
148 James L. Smith, Inscrutable OPEC? Behavioral Tests of the Cartel Hypothesis, 26 ENERGY 
J. 51, 53 (2005) ("[E]stimated demand elasticities numerically below -1 would constitute 
evidence not inconsistent with the cartel hypothesis."). 
149 Posner, Social Costs, supra note 147. 
ISO Economists have generated thousands of empirical estimates of demand that have 
reliable demand elasticities. See, e.g., Craig A. Gallet, The Demand for Alcohol: A Meta-Analysis 
of Elasticities, 51 AUSTRAL. J. AGRIC. & REs. ECON. 121 (2007) (compiling 132 high-quality 
published studies of the demand for alcoholic beverages). However, there are very few papers 
that contain both calculated overcharges and elasticities. 
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In the first cartel example, Posner calculates the DWL ratio for the 
first episode (1929-1931) of the global nitrogen fertilizer cartel to be 
31 %.151 Second, the heavily studied Joint Economic Committee Eastern 
U.S. railway cartel yields DWL ratios of 26%.152 Third, a well regarded 
study of the U.S. cane sugar cartel of 1890-1914 implies a DWL ratio of 
12% to 13%.153 Fourth, a 1923-1968 Norwegian cement cartel has a 
DWL ratio of 19%.154 Fifth, an excellent dynamic simulation model of 
the U.S. lysine cartel suggests a DWL ratio of 21 % to 27%.155 In sum, five 
leading studies of effective cartels find that the elasticities are between 
-0.95 and -1.64 for effective cartels, as expected, and that the DWL 
ratios of 12% to 31% are strongly positively related to the overcharge 
rate. Finally, an impressive examination of the Alcoa U.S. aluminum 
monopoly during 1923-1940 concludes that demand elasticity was -2.1 
and that the DWL was 62% to 66% of the income transfer. 156 The 
aluminum example illustrates a general finding of the cartel literature: 
cartels aim at achieving true monopoly power, but typically, they must 
settle for a weaker degree of market power. 
To arrive at a reasonable DWL ratio for contemporary private 
cartels, we will use a 45% mean average overcharge l57 and combine it 
with the aforementioned -0.95 and -1.64 elasticity of demand range. ISS 
These parameters result in a DWL ratio of 6% to 20%.159 Using the 
median overcharge of 22% 160 instead, the DWL ratio range is reduced to 
151 Posner, Social Costs, supra note 147, at 820. The overcharge was 75% and the elasticity 
was 1.45. Id. 
152 Glenn Ellison, Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Economic Committee, 25 RAND J. 
EeON. 37, 51 tbl.7 (1994) (finding an overcharge of 50.8% and elasticity of -1.59 using 
Model 3). 
153 David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Testing Static Oligopoly Models: Conduct and Cost 
in the Sugar Industry, 1890-1914, 29 RAND J. EeON. 355, 367 (1998) (computing an average 
annual overcharge of 13.4% and elasticity of -2.03 to -2.24 during high season; during the five 
most effective years, 1893-1897, the overcharge was 31.0%, implying a DWL ratio of 24% to 
27%). 
154 Lars-Hendrik Roller & Frode Steen, On the Workings of a Cartel: Evidence from the 
Norwegian Cement Industry, 96 AM. EeON. REv. 321, 322 (2006) (finding an overcharge of 
34.5% and an elasticity of -1.47). 
155 Nicolas de Roos, Examining Models of Collusion: The Market for Lysine, 24 INT'L. J. 
INDUS. ORG. 1083, 1103 (2006) (estimating an overcharge of 61.5%, and the author favors a 
manager's subjective notion of elasticity of -1.1 to -1.4). 
156 Valerie Y. Suslow, Estimating Monopoly Behavior with Competitive Recycling: An 
Application to Alcoa, 17 RAND J. EeON. 389 (1986) (computing an overcharge of 150% and an 
elasticity of -2.0 to -2.1). 
157 In addition to the material in this Section, this figure is based upon Connor and Lande, 
supra note 14, at 559. The literature studies' mean was 49% and the mean of verdicts was 31 %. 
The mean for the seventy-five cartels in our study was 60.3%. Id. 
158 See John M. Connor, Price Fixing Overcharges: Revised 2nd Edition (Working Paper Apr. 
27, 2010) available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1610262 (expanding and updating the study in 
Connor & Lande, supra note 14; Table 7 shows that the mean overcharge for all cartels is 46%, 
including many with zero price effects). 
159 Applying the formula, we have 1/2 x 0.45, which is then multiplied by 1.0 or 1.65. 
160 In addition to the material in this section, this overcharge percentage is based upon 
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3% to 10%. Combined, these alternative calculations produce range 
extremes from 3% to 20%.161 That is, the allocative inefficiency 
associated with cartelization is between $3 and $20 for every $100 in 
cartel overcharges, and the "net harm to others" will be $103 to $120. 
Therefore, we will assume that for every $100 in cartel overcharges, 
there is between $3 and $20 in accompanying allocative inefficiency 
effects. 
C. Umbrella Effects of Supracompetitive Pricing 
When a cartel raises prices, the relevant market sometimes 
contains a non-colluding fringe of smaller firms that are able to raise 
prices due to the higher overall market price set by the cartel. Since the 
fringe firms did not participate in the collusion, they did not violate any 
law and so cannot be fined or sued successfully in a private case. 
Nevertheless, these "umbrella effects" are another "net harm to others" 
from the cartel. If a cartel raised prices by $90 million, for example, and 
caused the non-colluding fringe to raise prices by $10 million, the "net 
harm to others" from the cartel should rise to $100 million. Where this 
data is available, our optimal deterrence calculation takes this into 
account. 
However, this factor might not be significant empirically, and it is 
likely to be difficult to ascertain, even approximately. There certainly 
have been powerful, if short-lived, cartels with significantly less than a 
100% market share. For example, the citric acid cartel only had 60% of 
global production; for vitamin B1 the increase in Chinese production 
led to a cartel market share decline from 70% to 52%; for European 
industrial tubes the cartel had 75% to 85% of the market. 162 We believe, 
however, that effective cartels with low market shares for long periods 
are not common. 
Including this factor explicitly in the optimal deterrence 
calculations could also lead to other complications. First, we cannot be 
sure the fringe raised prices to the same extent as the cartel. Perhaps 
some or all of the fringe firms decided to price somewhat lower than the 
cartel and thereby gain market share. Second, sometimes reports about 
cartel cases are not careful about market definition, and many-perhaps 
most-cartel cases do not contain precise market definition findings by 
a court. This applies both to consent orders in criminal cases and to 
Connor and Lande, supra note 14, at 515. The literature studies' mean was 25%, and the mean 
of verdicts was 22%. The median for the seventy-five cartels in our study was 20%. ld. 
161 This is a conservative resolution of the issues. 
162 Iwan Bos & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous 
Firms, 41 RAND J. EeON. 92, 92-93 (2010). 
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private settlements. For this reason it can be difficult to be sure which 
sales of non -colluding firms truly were in the same product and 
geographic market as the cartel. Moreover, as a practical matter almost 
every parameter in a consent order or private case, including market 
definition, is subject to a negotiation and potential compromise. No 
doubt, many reported cartel market shares are accurate, but there surely 
are other times where the size of reported relevant markets have been 
negotiated down or misdefined. 
Although we are tempted to consider this factor in the optimal 
deterrence calculations through the use of an especially broad range of 
possible values, instead we will simply take note of this issue. We will 
not attempt to estimate how large cartels' umbrella effects are 
empirically or to take them into account in our optimal deterrence 
calculations. 
IV. THE PROBABILITY OF CARTEL DETECTION AND PROOF 
OF COLLUSION 
Optimal deterrence theory is concerned with the expectations of 
the founders of cartels as to whether any cartel they are considering 
forming will be detected and, if detected, proven in court to have 
violated the antitrust laws. 163 These individuals' predictions are formed 
by a variety of factors, including the perceptions and historical 
experience of the individuals themselves, their firms, their legal and 
financial advisors, and their observations of others in comparable 
potential price-fixing situations.l64 Since it is impossible to know the 
actual expectations of the "average" would-be cartelist, we instead use 
the closest approximations we can find: the actual record of how often 
cartels are detected and, once detected, proven in court to be illegal. 
A. Cartel Detection 
The first question-how likely is it that a cartel will be discovered-
has been answered by researchers using three basic types of 
methodologies. The first is based upon quantitative economic studies. 
The original and most famous of these was by Bryant and Eckard.l65 
163 This subsection is based upon John M. Connor, Deterrence Power of Penalties on 
International Cartels (Aug. 6, 2009) (unpublished study) (on file with authors). 
164 Case evidence supports the view that potential conspirators are adept at predicting the 
quarterly or annual profits from an effective cartel, though they might have uncertainty about 
the scheme's longevity. [d. at 9. 
165 Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard Jr., Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting 
Caught, 73 REv. ECON. & STAT. 531 (1991). Like all similar studies, p is computed from samples 
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They estimated the confidence interval for cartels' probability of 
detection (p) to be 13% to 17%. Their data set consists of companies 
convicted for domestic U.S. price fixing during 1961-1988. This study is 
widely cited by scholars 166 and is approvingly cited by at least eight 
subsequent writers on antitrust enforcement who made their own 
detection estimates. 167 
Two subsequent empirical studies replicated Bryant and Eckard's 
approach. 16B Golub et al. sampled convicted U.S. price fixers for a period 
after 1988; their estimated range for p is identical with that of Bryant 
and Eckard.169 Their sample includes some international cartels and a 
period that overlaps with the revised DOJ leniency program. Combe et 
aL also apply the Bryant and Eckard method of analysis to a sample of 
firms that were fined for infringing E.U. price-fixing prohibitions. 170 All 
of these convictions involved international cartels (some of them intra-
E.U.), but only a small share of these infringements occurred during the 
time that the European Commission (EC) had adopted a formal 
leniency program. l7l In sum, all three studies-using different data 
sets-point to a probability of detection in the 13% to 17% range. The 
stability of p across differing time periods and jurisdictions is 
impressive. 
Bryant and Eckard published their study in 1991, prior to the 1993 
advent of the DOl's wildly successful cartelleniency/amnesty programs 
which have in some form been adopted by more than twenty 
jurisdictions, including the European Union (EU).172 The vast increase 
in numbers of cartels detected since 1993 could be due to an increase in 
the probability that cartels are detected. In a highly original paper, 
Miller provided an economic estimate of the post-1993 increase in the 
probability that cartels will be detected by the DOJ.i73 His sample 
of discovered cartels. Founders of never-discovered cartels might rationally conjecture a lower 
p. Thus, computed sizes of p may well overstate the actual average p for all cartels. 
166 A Google Scholar search on February 9,2011, found fifty citations. 
167 See infra Appendix tbl.3. 
168 All three use essentially the same method-an event study of stock market prices-to 
estimate a statistically calculated 90% confidence interval of the probability of cartel detection 
(p). However, the three apply that method to three different samples from two jurisdictions. 
169 Alla Golub et aI., The Profitability of Price Fixing: Have Stronger Antitrust Sanctions 
Deterred?, (2005) (presented before the International Industrial Organization Conference 3, 
Atlanta, Ga. (Apr. 8-9, 2005)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1188515. 
170 Emmanuel Combe et aI., Cartels: The Probability of Getting Caught in the European 
Union (Bruges Eur. Eeon. Res. Papers, Working Paper No. 12, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015061. 
171 Their point estimate of p is close to 13%. 
172 See Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. for Criminal Enforcement, 
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address Before the 24th Annual National Institute on 
White Collar Crime: The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement over the Last Twenty 
Years (Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.htm. 
173 Nathan H. Miller, Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement, 99 AM. EeoN. REv. 750 
(2009). 
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consisted of all cartels discovered and convicted by the DOJ between 
January 1985 and March 2005. Comparing the pattern of pre-1993 cartel 
enforcement with the post-1993 period, he estimates that there was an 
increase of about 60% in the detection of existing cartels and a reduction 
of about 60% in the rate of cartel formation. 174 A possible limitation of 
Miller's study is that, in his sample, only 9% of the observations were 
international cartels. 175 Nevertheless, if one applies Miller's findings to 
the earlier three detection-probability studies, the post-1993 range for 
the probability of cartel detection becomes 20.8% to 27.2%. 
A completely different method of estimating the probability that 
cartels are detected relies on the opinions of cartel scholars. Most have 
legal training or write in legal-economic publicationS,176 Many have 
prosecutorial experience; others have worked extensively with alleged 
cartel defendants. 177 Those who have provided specific estimates are 
listed in Table 3. 178 The opinions and conclusions of these twenty-five 
authors predominantly suggest a 10% to 25% chance of detection, 
although some go as high as 33%.l79 
It is clear that some of these estimates are meant to be purely 
illustrative,180 while others are from surveys or are intended to be true 
depictions of reality.181 The three writings that are clearly illustrative 
average 29%.182 If one takes the non-illustrative estimates and eliminates 
those that depend on Bryant and Eckard, the remainder are 
independent estimates. For the ten independent estimates that are not 
purely illustrative, the upper-end estimates average 25.6%, which is 
comfortably close to the economists' 27% high estimate. 183 
There is yet another way to estimate the average detection 
probability-opinion surveys. Although these surveys might not ask 
precisely the questions that are best for our purposes, they too suggest 
174 ld. at 760-61. 
175 As we understand these results, both changes are simultaneous after 1993. To illustrate, 
suppose that there are 100 cartels being formed that affect the U.S. economy each year in the 
years before 1993. With a known median life of seven years and no enforcement, the total stock 
of prosecutable cartels would reach a steady state of 700 cartels. With discovery of 15%, then a 
net formation of 85 lasting seven years would imply discoveries of 15 per year and a stock of 
600 hidden cartels. Then, using Miller's results, with amnesty the number formations drops to 
40 per year or 280 total cartels, of which about 70 are discovered per year and 210 are hidden in 
any given year. Thus, deterrence improves (fewer net formation and fewer hidden cartels), and 
detection rates per year also rise. 
176 See infra Appendix tb1.3. 
177 See id. 
178 See infra Appendix tb1.3. 
179 See id. 
180 See Landes, supra note 15, at 656. 
181 E.g., Alan R. Beckenstein & H. Landis Gabel, Antitrust Compliance: Results of a Survey of 
Legal Opinion, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 459 (1982). 
182 See POSNER, supra note 65, at 47; Landes, supra note 15; Werden, supra note 20, at 27-29. 
183 See infra Appendix tb1.3. 
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low cartel detection rates. For example, in the survey by Feinberg of 
antitrust lawyers working in Brussels, only 5% disagreed with the 
statement, "[t]he [EC] fails to detect most [price-fixing] violations," 
whereas 62% agreed with the statement. 184 A large-scale 2006 survey of 
competition lawyers working in the United Kingdom (UK) and Brussels 
asked how many times one of their clients had, upon seeking legal 
advice, abandoned or changed a possible cartel practice because the 
clients feared an antitrust investigation, and how many of their clients 
had been the subjects of an adverse cartel ruling by the UK's OffIce of 
Fair Trade. The result was that 22% were said to have been in violation 
of cartel laws. 18S This is, of course, a minimal indicator of detection 
because some participants in secret cartels do not seek legal advice. 
Professor Daniel Sokol recently conducted another very interesting 
survey. 186 He asked a sample of 234 antitrust lawyers, 
In the past 2 years, by total number of matters, how often have clients 
come to you with hard-core cartel issues that to your and/or their 
knowledge never got investigated by U.S. government (federal and 
state) enforcers as opposed to situations where the underlying 
behavior ultimately led to U.S. investigation of your client? 
If the "Not Applicable" responses are eliminated, 52% of the 
lawyers said this had happened to them at least once. 187 
All told the above methods yield estimates for p: 1) 20.8% to 27.2%, 
2) 25.6%, and 3) non-quantifiable but low estimates that are roughly 
consistent with the first two estimates. In the interest of being 
conservative, for the remainder of this Article we adopt a relatively high 
25% to 30% probability that cartels will be detected. 188 
184 Robert M. Feinberg, The Enforcement and Effects of European Antitrust Policy: A Survey 
of Legal Opinion, 23 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 373 (1985). Other interesting results were: 1) 95% 
agreed that price fixing was intentional and for profit gain, and 2) 100% agreed that the greatest 
deterrents are a high probability of detection and high EU fines. Id. 
185 DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP, THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT BY 
THE OFT (2007), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk!shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-
workloft962.pdf. 
186 See Sokol, supra note 28. 
187 See id. at 239 tb1.l4. 
188 We believe our methodology has been overly conservative and that the actual chances a 
cartel will be detected are lower than 25-30%. As an indication of how conservative our 
methodology is, Ginsburg and Wright recently performed an analysis very similar to ours, 
including analyzing both the Bryant and Eckard, as well as the Miller studies, and concluded 
that 25% was their best estimate as to the rate of cartel detection. See Ginsburg & Wright, supra 
note 25, at 8. 
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B. Probability a Detected Cartel Will Be Convicted 
Even if a cartel is detected, its chances of being convicted are less 
than 100%. The DOT asserts that in 95% of its cases, indictments end in 
convictions.l89 Indeed, the evidence is so damning in most cases that 
nearly all defendants negotiate a guilty plea. 190 On the other hand, when 
accused individual price flxers choose to litigate a criminal price-flxing 
case, the government wins only approximately half the time. 191 Thus, 
discovered cartelists that are able to afford the best legal defense team 
and are adept at hiding or obfuscating the most incriminating evidence 
might well judge their chances of conviction to be less than the DOT's 
95% flgure. 192 
From 2005 to 2009, of the 87 individuals charged with 
international price flxing, 64 pled guilty and 4 were found guilty.193 On 
the other hand, 7 were acquitted, 11 became fugitives, and 1 indictment 
was dismissed. 194 Therefore, in total, from 2005-2009, 68 of 87 (78%) 
were convicted. For the entire 1990-2009 period the corresponding 
flgure is 158 of 222 (71%).195 Therefore, a high estimate of how often 
detected cartelists escape conviction would be the 22% to 28% who were 
not convicted in DOT proceedings. 
However, some or all of the non -convicted defendants could have 
been innocent. Others could have been guilty, but perhaps the DOT 
simply could not prove their guilt sufficiently to meet the high standards 
for felony convictions. There is no way to know how many of those who 
were not convicted actually formed a cartel, and that this cartel was 
detected, but they nevertheless got away with their crime. At a 
minimum, however, we believe we can fairly make a presumption 
concerning the fugitives from prosecution. A total of 11 of the 87 
defendants from 2005-2009, and 47 of the 222 from 1990-2009, were 
fugitives. l96 We believe it is reasonable to presume that it is more likely 
189 See WORKLOAD STATISTICS 1990-1999, supra note 90, at 7; WORKLOAD STATISTICS 
2000-2009, supra note 90, at 8. 
190 Connor, supra note 14, at 328. 
191 Id. (finding that only fifteen of twenty-eight indicted individuals were convicted). 
192 See id. 
193 See Connor, supra note 14, at 539 tbl. 3. The Antitrust Division's official statistics, 
reported supra note 25, cannot, however, be used to derive comparable won/lost ratios for 
domestic cases. For the 1990-2009 federal fiscal years, we can determine that there were 929 
individuals indicted for Sherman Act section 1 criminal offenses; of those, 57% were fined, 38% 
were imprisoned, and 28% were subject to other forms of confinement. But these three types of 
sanctions are not additive. While nearly all those who were imprisoned were also fined, we 
cannot determine what proportion of those fined were also imprisoned or otherwise confined. 
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that a fugitive is a price flxer who fled, rather than an innocent person 
who could not prove their innocence. 197 Therefore, on this basis there is 
(using data from the two time periods) a 47/222 = 21%, or 11/87 = 13%, 
chance that detected price flxers will get away with their crime. 198 
By contrast, the DOJ reports that from 2005-2009 they won 124 
cases against corporate and individual defendants, mostly through plea 
agreements, and lost seven. 199 This is a 95% success rate; much higher 
than their 77% success rate for the same period when prosecuting 
individuals. Does this mean that the corporations are signiflcantly more 
likely to be convicted than individuals? Yes, if one counts any corporate 
flne at all as a government "success." However, we cannot help but 
wonder whether every DOJ "win" is truly a win. Almost all of the DOJ 
"wins" are plea agreements or consent orders. No doubt, many 
corporate or individual defendants simply agree to a "slap on the wrist" 
consent order rather than endure the signiflcant legal expenses and 
corporate disruption involved in taking the DOJ to court. No doubt 
many of the token DOJ "wins," which secured only minimal flnes and 
no prison time, were really defendant victories. Ideally we would flnd 
and use in our calculations the percentage of detected cartels that not 
only were convicted, but that also received signiflcant sanctions. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to tell which of DOl's alleged "wins" are 
truly wins, and which ones mostly, in reality, should instead be 
categorized as being DOJ 10sses.2oo 
It seems likely, however, that individuals are less likely to plead 
guilty even to a token flne than are corporations. Corporations might 
readily agree to a "slap on the wrist" flne as part of a settlement with the 
DOJ because to them small flnes are almost like parking tickets, and 
some large corporations receive similar "costs of doing business" 
frequently.201 Moreover, corporate managers are paying flnes with other 
people's (Le., the stockholders') money. As a matter of ethics they would 
deny this makes a difference, but unless the corporate offlcer owns a 
large share of a company's stock, the principle/agent literature suggests 
197 Innocent people sometimes flee. This is why one can only presume that fugitives actually 
fixed prices. 
198 These figures and ratios are for individuals, not for corporations, and most of our 
sanctions are corporate, not individual. We will, however, assume that the conviction rates for 
individuals apply to corporations, as well. 
199 Id. 
200 Perhaps one should draw a very low arbitrary line, such as making the assumption that 
any DOT fine (and private settlement, as well) for less than 1% of the volume of commerce 
involved was "really" a defendant victory. Or perhaps one should classify these settlements into 
groups, such as 0-1 % of affected commerce, 1-3%, 3-6%, etc., and then we could argue over 
the point at which the settlements are likely to be genuine victories. 
201 There are exceptions, of course. Corporate felony convictions can bar a firm from 
bidding for federal contracts for a number of years, and this could be a major blow to firms that 
depend on such sales for a significant portion of their revenues. 
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he or she is more likely to let personal motives affect what is best for the 
owners. 202 By contrast, an individual has more to lose and may be more 
risk-averse. If an individual admits to a felony, even one resulting only 
in a small fine, their personal record has been stained, perhaps with 
dramatic results for the person involved. For these reasons, individuals 
are, on average, more likely to resist than a large corporation. If we are 
correct, the DOJ's conviction rate for individuals is a better reflection of 
the DOJ's real wonllost record than the corporate statistics. 
We also believe that the DOJ's 95% conviction rate indicates that 
the Antitrust Division is risk-averse, and usually indicts only when it has 
a relatively large chance of conviction in the event an alleged price fixer 
insists on a trial. There are a number of times, for example, when the 
DOJ began a cartel investigation, but never filed an indictment, yet 
private plaintiffs secured a significant settlement against these same 
corporations)03 
To be conservative, however, we will base our final conviction 
estimate on the statistics for individual convictions, and assume that 
23% to 28% (high estimate) or 20% to 23% (low estimate) of detected 
cartels are not convicted. In our final calculations we will round these 
numbers slightly downwards, to 20%.204 Note that the probability of a 
cartel being detected (25% to 30%) and convicted (80%) then becomes 
20% to 24% (depending on whether low or high estimates are used). 
v. THE OPTIMAL DETERRENCE CALCULATIONS 
As noted in Part I, under the optimal deterrence approach, cartel 
sanctions should be equal to: 
Net harms to others -;- (Probability of detection x Probability of 
conviction) 
202 This topic, also studied under the titles "managerial capitalism" or "managerial utility," is 
reviewed by Alan Hughes, Managerial Capitalism, in 3 THE NEW PALGRA VE: A DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS 293-95 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). 
203 See, e.g., In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (E.D. 
Pa. 2001); Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust 
Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. 1. Rev. 879 (2008), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracCid=1090661 (noting government investigation, but no 
government case flled; private recovery of $106 million in cash). 
204 We believe that the 20% estimate (which means that 80% of detected price fixers are 
convicted) substantially understates the probability that detected individuals or corporations 
will escape conviction. However, the only reliable data on this point we have been able to find 
concerns the fugitives, so we do not feel comfortable assuming, for example, that only 50% of 
detected cartels are convicted. 
We also note that DOl's risk aversion and the fact that many of their wins are only token 
victories probably mean that the 20% figure we selected probably underestimates the 
percentage of detected cartels that truly escape punishment for their crime. 
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We have been able to ascertain approximations for each of the required 
quantities for seventy-five cartels that have been sanctioned in the 
United States since 1990.205 We illustrate how we carried out the optimal 
deterrence analysis and calculations using the lysine cartel as an 
example. 
A. The Lysine Cartel as an Example 
1. Background on the Lysine Cartel 
The lysine cartel was one of the earliest large international cartels 
to be heavily sanctioned in multiple ways.206 It dated back to mid-1992. 
The U.S. Department of Justice began an investigation in late 1992 that 
culminated in a June 27, 1995 raid, where more than seventy FBI agents 
simultaneously raided the headquarters of Archer-Daniels-Midland 
Company (ADM) and a number of ADM officers' homes. 207 Within a 
very short time, investigators had also raided the offices of four other 
companies that manufactured or imported lysine. 
During this cartel's existence the average manufacturers' delivered 
price of lysine in the United States rose from $0.68 per pound to a 
plateau of $0.98 (October to December 1992), fell again to $0.65 (May 
1993), and rose quickly again to above $1.00 for most of the remainder 
of the conspiracy period.20s Early in this cartel's existence an ADM Vice 
President was caught on tape saying that their recently concluded 
agreement would generate $200 million in joint profits annually in a 
global market for lysine that generated from $500-700 million in annual 
sales. 209 His prediction turned out to be astonishingly accurate. 210 
205 Although we started with a larger universe of cartels, we were forced to eliminate many 
from our sample because the necessary data was not available, was insufficiently reliable, or 
some legal actions were unresolved. Every one of our final group is an international cartel. 
Although we are unable to state with certainty that all of the assembled data on these seventy-
five cartels are perfect and complete in every respect, we believe all of it to be generally reliable 
and accurate. As an example of its potential inadequacy, although we looked diligently for 
settlements in private cases and believe we found every significant settlement, there surely have 
been settlements that we missed, especially secret settlements and opt -out settlements too small 
to have made the legal, general or trade press. By contrast, class action settlements usually 
cannot be secret and almost always are reported in the legal, general, or trade press. 
206 See Connor, supra note 56. As will be apparent from the Conclusions, infra, the lysine 
cartel was one for which actual sanctions were relatively close to the optimum. 
207 This Article's analysis of the lysine case is based upon John M. Connor, Global Cartels 
Redux: The Lysine Antitrust Litigation, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 300, 300 (John E. 
Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 5th ed. 2009). 
20S Id. at 12. 
209 Id. at 13. 
210 Id. 
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Ultimately the lysine cartelists pled guilty, and in late 1996 incurred 
U.S. fines that totaled $95.55 million. 211 The DOJ also prosecuted four 
lysine executives in a highly publicized jury trial held in Chicago in the 
summer of 1998.212 Three of the four were found guilty and were heavily 
sentenced, to a total of ninety-nine months in prison. 213 The fourth 
defendant, a managing director of Ajinomoto of Japan, remains a 
fugitive. 214 
Within a year of the FBI raids, more than forty civil antitrust suits 
were filed in U.S. federal courtS.215 Approximately 400 plaintiffs were 
certified as a single federal class of direct purchasers, and in July 1996, 
the federal class in Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation settled with 
the three largest defendants for $45 million.216 The two other defendants 
settled for almost $5 million about a year later. 217 There also were 
significant numbers of indirect purchaser suits and opt-out suits which 
have been very difficult to trace, but these payments have been 
estimated to total more than $25 million, and to produce total payments 
in the U.S. private suits of approximately $82.5 million.2lB 
2. Optimal Fine Calculations for the Lysine Cartel 
What should the overall level of sanctions have been, ex-ante, for 
the Lysine cartel?219 Before one could calculate this using the "net harm 
to others" approach, however, it is necessary to account for inflation or 
the time value (opportunity cost220) of money.221 Because we are 
2ll ld. This includes $94.3 million in corporate fines and $1.25 million in individual fines, 
which we tripled to give more weight to individual sanctions relative to corporate sanctions. 
For a discussion of this tripling, see supra Part II. 
212 Connor, supra note 207, at 1. 
213 ld. The cartel also was fined by the antitrust authorities of Canada, Mexico, and the 
European Union a total of at least another $121.5 million. ld. at 2. 
214 ld. at 2. 
215 ld. 
216 ld. The settlement was approved in late 1996, before the federal fines were announced, 
which is very unusual. ld. 
217 ld. 
218 ld. 
219 This number is only illustrative because society must as a practical matter focus upon 
general deterrence, not specific deterrence. We could never hope to know the mindsets of 
particular corporate executives well enough to calculate the penalty that optimally would 
prevent those individuals from cartelizing, the most we can do is to calculate a good overall, 
general deterrence penalty and then implement it generally. For an analysis of these issues, see 
supra Part I. 
220 "Opportunity cost" is a fundamental economic concept positing that the value of any 
economic choice actually made is approximately equal to the next best alternative course of 
action not taken. For example, the value of an afternoon's leisure to an individual might be 
approximated by the income foregone in employment. Similarly, the cost of consuming for a 
household today might be the future income from investing the same amount in some financial 
instrument. 
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attempting to determine how much purchasers were harmed by paying 
supra-competitive prices for their products or services, we should 
analyze the opportunity cost issue from the victims' perspective and 
attempt to place the victims in the position in which they would have 
been had no violation occurred. Adjusting for the time value of money 
can raise the amounts involved significantly, especially when there is a 
long lag between the collusive period and fine or the court approval of a 
settlement. 
It is impossible to know what would have happened to the 
overcharges had the violation not occurred. Consumer-victims or 
business-victims might have invested the overcharges they were forced 
to pay to the cartel in, for example, Treasury bills. Alternatively, suppose 
a victim had been harmed and believed it would recover from defendant 
in X years. A reasonable course of action for that victim might be to 
obtain an X year loan for the amount of the damages at the prevailing 
consumer loan or business loan interest rates, both of which would 
exceed the prime interest rate. Moreover, since the overcharges were 
involuntary (and illegal!) , it would be fair to resolve doubts over the 
correct adjustment rate in favor of the victims. The members of the 
cartel, by contrast, might have invested the overcharges instead. 
A conservative approach to these issues consistent with principles 
of financial economics is to approximate the opportunity cost to the 
victims of being deprived of their money for a period of time by using 
the prime rate of interest plus one percent. 222 For simplicity, we will use 
as our initial year the midpoint year of the cartel,223 and as the fine year 
the year in which the first corporate defendant plead guilty.224 The 
221 Neither fines nor payments made in private cases contain prejudgment interest. 
However, once a private case results in a verdict or a court-approved settlement, post-judgment 
in terest begins to accrue. See Lande, supra note 17. 
222 The prime rate of interest includes a component that anticipates what lenders expect 
inflation to be over the loan period. Another portion of the prime rate is an average low-risk 
rate of return to be earned by borrowers. The one percent is added to account for the fact that 
borrowers expect to earn profits on the investment above a low-risk investment rate of return. 
223 This approximates the mean date that buyers' funds were transferred to the owners of the 
cartels. If we had the data we would instead assess the magnitude of the cartel overcharges on a 
yearly basis, and would separately take into account the date of each of the imposed fines and 
settlements with each cartelist, and make the adjustments accordingly. This would be slightly 
more accurate because cartels do not overcharge the same percentage every year, and because 
some fmes and some settlements-particularly opt-out settlements-take place years later. As a 
practical matter, however, we rarely have the necessary information. We do, however, have 
good information concerning the starting and ending dates for all seventy-five cartels in our 
sample. 
Normally, overt collusion stops on the date subpoenas are served or inspections are carried 
out by an antitrust authority. In some cases collusion may have stopped years earlier. Other 
times the firms continue implicit collusion even after the explicit collusion is uncovered and the 
formal (proven) collusion ends. 
224 This too is conservative, for two reasons. In some cartel cases the late-pleading 
participants take a year or two to plead after the first defendant does so. Second, defendants 
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terminal year for settlements in private suits is the year in which the 
federal class settlement or other private case receives preliminary 
judicial approval. 225 Although this approach is perhaps too low and thus 
too conservative from the "net harm to others" perspective, it does have 
the advantage of approximating the value of the overcharges to the 
cartelists, who of course continue to have use of the victims' money 
interest-free until they pay their fines or damages in private suits. After 
the net present value of the fines or settlements is calculated, we adjust 
the value of money, due to general inflation, to the year 2010, employing 
the annual Producer Price Index calculated by the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor.226 Expressing all penalties in 2010 dollars permits us to make 
meaningful comparisons across conspiracies and punishments that took 
place at different times. 
If we restrict all data and calculations to the United States, for the 
lysine cartel the optimal penalty ((net harms to others) -;- (probability of 
detection x probability of proof)) can be calculated as follows: 
• The net harms to U.S. direct purchasers were $80 million, 
expressed in 1993-1995 dollars.227 To apply the "net harm" or 
investment-opportunity-cost adjustment, we use Federal Reserve 
Bank prime rates of interest for the years 1995 and 1996, plus 1 %, 
or 12.22%. Thus, the damages were $80 million,228 which is the 
sum that the victims ought to have received when the cartel 
operated, and is equivalent to $119.8 million in 2010 dollars. 
• These overcharge figures should be multiplied by 1.03 to 1.20 to 
account for the additional allocative inefficiency harms 
(deadweight loss) of market power. 229 
increasingly pay their fines in up to six installments spread over five years. Thus, by using the 
initial fine date we are over-inflating the effect of fines to some extent. But this assumption 
makes the calculations simpler. 
225 This date is conservative because in many instances there are opt-outs from the primary 
class, and opt-out suits typically take months or years to negotiate beyond the class approval 
date. 
226 See CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 115. We use the Producer Price Index for 
intermediate materials, rather than the Consumer Price Index, because most cartelized 
products are inputs sold to manufacturers. If we had used the Consumer Price Index, however, 
the results would be similar. 
227 See Connor, supra note 207, at 302. 
228 The actual overcharge amount is $80 million. To this should be added foregone profit of 
$9.8 million which should have accrued between the dates of the actual overcharges and 1996. 
Another way of looking at the $9.8 million is that it represents income to the cartelists on the 
$80 million in illegal monopoly profits held in the companies' treasuries. By rights, this income 
belonged to the victims all along. This total of $89.8 million is the figure that we convert to 
2010 dollars. 
229 For an explanation of the allocative inefficiency adjustment, see supra Part III.B. 
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• The average probability of cartel detection, the evidence shows, is 
25% to 30%.230 
• The average probability the enforcers will be able to prove that 
the cartel violated the law has been estimated to be 80%.231 
Therefore, for the Lysine cartel, the optimal U.S. penalty (in 
millions of 20 10 dollars) was: 
($119.8 x 1.03) -;. (0.30 x 0.80) (low estimate) 
or 
($119.8 x 1.20) -;. (0.25 x 0.80) (high estimate) 
= $514-719 
The optimal penalty should be compared to the actual U.S. sanctions 
that were imposed on the Lysine cartel. When expressed in terms of 
millions of 2010 dollars they were: 
$114 Fines (converting $98.55 million in fines in 1996-2010 
dollars) 
+ 99 Private Suits (converting $82.5 million in recoveries in 1996-
2010 dollars)232 
+ 50 Prison-Equivalent for ninety-nine months of U.S. prison time 
at $500,000 per month233 
$263 Total Sanctions 
Thus, even though the lysine cartel was heavily sanctioned in the United 
States in three ways (by fines, prison for top executives, and by private 
litigation), the combination of the sanctions that were imposed is only 
37% to 51%234 as large as the overall amount of sanctions that should 
have been imposed from the perspective of optimal deterrence. 
230 See supra Part IV.A. 
231 See supra Part IV.B. Another issue concerns the distinction between "technical" 
convictions and "real" convictions. Some of DOl's reported convictions may be technical 
convictions that amounted only to "slaps on the wrist" and produced only token fines. Perhaps, 
we should have attempted to find and use in our calculations the percentage of detected cartels 
that not only were convicted, but that also received Significant sanctions. Because of the 
subjectivity of classifying fines this way, we did not, however, attempt to make this distinction. 
232 Only the first settlement was in 1996, but to be conservative we assumed that all of the 
payments in every private case were made in 1996. 
We of course can only count settlements known to us through our searches of the legal 
and general media. We readily acknowledge the existence of secret settlements, especially 
involving opt-out cases. However, every class action must be approved by a court, so no class 
action settlement can be secret. Publicly traded corporations often are required to report 
significant income or losses on their balance sheets and cannot, for example, simply state in its 
annual report that it paid or received a significant, but secret, sum in an antitrust case. Still, we 
surely missed some settlements. 
233 For the analysis of the monetary equivalent of prison sentences, see supra Part II. 
234 Depending upon when and how the figures involved are rounded, this range could also 
be expressed as 37% to 49%. 
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B. Calculating Overall Optimal Deterrence Using Every Cartel 
in Our Sample 
We have undertaken the same analysis for all seventy-five cartels 
for which we have been able to ascertain the necessary data. 235 The 
overall results show that, on average, the value of the imposed U.S. 
sanctions has been much less than they should have been for society to 
obtain optimal deterrence against cartelization. If mean average figures 
are used, the total value of the imposed sanctions were only 15.8% to 
20.8% of their optimal level. If median figures are used, the imposed 
sanctions averaged only 9.2% to 12.1 % of optimality.236 
One outlier, E-Rate Federal Internet Program, may have been 
sanctioned more than the optimal amount (our results show 125% to 
175% of optimality).237 A second cartel, PVC Windows Coverings, was 
probably optimally sanctioned (we estimate 88% to 124%). The other 
seventy-three were sanctioned much less than optimally. Moreover, half 
of the seventy-five were sanctioned less than 10% of the optimal 
amount. It certainly is possible that some of the individual firms in the 
235 Data employed and calculations are available at http://www.cardozolawreview.com/ 
content/34-2/Connor.Lande.34.2/AntitrustStudyRawData.pdf. 
236 These results might, moreover, be too high for a methodological reason we have not yet 
discussed: for a variety of reasons, many of our sales figures might be overly small. The correct 
sales data would tend to lower the calculated ratios. This is because affected sales figures 
derived from seemingly reliable sources often are larger than the sum of the affected sales 
employed by the DOJ in sentencing the members of cartels. There may be quite defensible 
reasons for this. For example, because of the high degree of reliability of evidence needed to 
convict corporations for crimes, the DOJ may reduce the time periods, geographic region, or 
scope of products employed for calculating sales during collusion to that which can be proven 
"beyond a reasonable doubt." On the other hand, prosecutors sometimes may uncritically 
accept arguments made by defendants that diminish the scope of the affected market because of 
time pressures in settling guilty plea agreements, or because the government lacks the resources 
necessary to disprove defendant assertions. 
An example is the Central Indiana Ready-Mix Concrete case. In re Ready-Mixed Concrete 
Antitrust Litig., 261 F.R.D. 154 (S.D. Ind. 2009). Concrete for pouring is a relatively simple 
product; the counties involved and the time period were not issues in the case. A sales figure of 
$680 million for all seven firms involved in the cartel was reported in the local press; all seven 
paid civil settlements. The sales information purportedly came from transcripts of a jury trial of 
two executives (they were convicted) and from the testimony of the plaintiffs' class expert in 
fairness hearings (plaintiffs prevailed). Sales according to DOJ documents were much less. One 
participant was granted amnesty; two others were not charged, most likely because of 
cooperation agreements. The DOJ used a smaller geographic market definition than for civil 
plaintiffs. When one adds up the affected sales from the DOJ sentencing memoranda for the 
four companies that were criminally convicted of price fixing through plea agreements, the 
total is $391 million. Taking into account the fact that two of the smallest cartel members were 
not convicted because of bankruptcies, the DOl's total market affected sales is as much as 40% 
lower than the affected sales proven by the private litigants. See E-mail from John Connor to 
Scott Gilchrist, Attorney, Cohen & Malad, LLP (Aug. 24, 2011, 10:25 AM) (on file with author). 
237 This cartel was unusual for many reasons, including its record-breaking number of 
incarcerations. Moreover, because the affected sales of several school-district bids are 
unavailable, we believe that the total affected sales is Significantly underestimated. 
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seventy-five cartels were optimally or excessively sanctioned due to 
circumstances unique to those firms.238 From a deterrence perspective, 
however, would-be cartelists are unlikely to focus upon outliers rather 
than the norm. They are much more likely to be guided by what 
happened on average to the vast majority of cartels that affected the 
roughly $1 trillion in affected sales (about $2 trillion in 2010 dollars) in 
the cases covered by our study.239 
Our analysis is confined to effects within the United States. For 
each cartel, only United States overcharges, sales, corporate and 
individual fines, restitution payments, prison and house arrest time, and 
payouts in private cases were considered. For some of these cartels, 
particularly the more recent ones, the European Commission's fines 
have been as large as or larger than those in the United States. 240 If 
managers were assessing whether to form an international cartel, their 
probable overcharges in Europe, as well as the E.U.'s sanctions, should, 
of course, have been considered in addition to those imposed by the 
United States. It is indeed unfortunate that, regardless what they might 
conclude about the expected profitability of operating in Europe or 
238 Even if individual firms appear to have been sanctioned more than the amount calculated 
under the overall optimal deterrence approach, this could have been due to a number of factors 
that make the sanctions not excessive. Fundamentally, every firm in a cartel is jointly 
responsible for entirety of the cartel's overcharges. For this reason, it would be reasonable to 
attribute the entirety of a cartel's overcharges to an individual cartel member before carrying 
out the optimal deterrence calculations (although we have not done this in this Article). Only if 
this were done and the optimal deterrence calculations showed that the sanctions were 
excessive could there be true over-deterrence. 
Moreover, the alleged over-deterrence could result from a cartel not producing profits as 
high as its instigators had hoped. Perhaps if the cartel had been as profitable as its planners had 
hoped, the overall penalty level might have been too low. Further, we used reported or provable 
affected sales in our calculations. As noted supra, note 234, reported or provable sales often are 
lower than the true amounts. 
As we noted in Part I, the overall level of sanctions cannot be set, in advance, for particular 
individuals or corporations. The best we can do is to set the overall sanctions level for mean or 
median cartels, not for the outliers. 
239 One interesting factor that helped drive these conclusions is the relatively small effect of 
prison sentences. Their mean value per case was a relatively modest $13.6 million, or 17% of the 
average fine (the median is zero because for the majority of the cartels in the sample (forty-
eight out of seventy-five) there was no imprisonment). See supra note 231. Even though we 
valued the deterrence from a three-year sentence at $18 million (which is more than most 
estimates of the value of an entire life), this pales in comparison to the possible rewards from 
cartelization. See supra note 119. Nevertheless, the absence of a criminal sanction correlates 
with an exceedingly small overall sanction. Almost all of the fifteen cartels with actual sanctions 
that were less than 2% of optimal penalties had no criminal sanctions imposed. See supra Part 
IV.B. The absence of a criminal conviction means that the private sanctions cannot come close 
to providing optimal sanctions. By contrast, the E-Rate cartel case involved 626 months worth 
of prison, which constituted 85% of the sanctions in that case. For this data, see the online 
appendix, Antitrust Study Raw Data, at http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/34-2/ 
Connor .Lande.34.21 AntitrustStudyRawData. pdf. 
240 See John M. Connor, Has the European Commission Become More Severe in Punishing 
Cartels? Effects of the 2006 Guidelines, 32 EUR. COMPETITION. 1. REV. 27 (2011). 
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elsewhere, the combined level of U.S. sanctions are woefully inadequate 
to deter them from operating in the United States. 
Recent developments have not negated the policy import of our 
results. For example, criminal fines and prison sentences have risen 
since the mid-2004 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and 
Reform Act (ACPERA) amendment went into effect. 241 A GAO report 
on ACPERA shows that total criminal fines have risen by 51%, on 
average, and total jail time by 56% since ACPERA went into effect.242 
But these increases could well be explained by higher affected sales of 
cartels that colluded after 2004. Moreover, the GAO data refers to fines 
corrected for inflation on all cartels, both international and domestic, 
with fiscal years 2005-20lO being compared to 1994-2003. However, for 
international cartels over a comparable period we find that even though 
real fines did increase, real settlements and the value of prison declined 
so much that penalties per cartel declined by 38%.243 The explanation 
for this overall decline is that private settlements are, on average, the 
largest sanction in terms of the magnitude of their deterrence effects. 
CONCLUSIONS 
"If three is the wrong number, it is too small." 
- Judge Frank Easterbrook244 
The primary goal of this Article has been to determine whether the 
overall level of U.S. anti-cartel sanctions is optimal. This Article 
demonstrates that when the deterrence effects of every measurable 
sanction are considered (including corporate and individual fines, 
payments in private cases, restitution payments, and an allowance for 
incarceration), the overall level of anti-cartel sanctions is far too low. To 
protect victims optimally, the collective level of existing sanctions 
should be multiplied by a factor of five. Specifically, we find that on 
average the total value of imposed sanctions have been only 9% to 21 % 
as large as they should have been. 245 In other words, only if, on average, 
cartel sanctions were approximately five times as large as they are today, 
241 See supra note 2. 
242 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CRIMINAL CARTEL ENFORCEMENT: 
STAKEHOLDER VIEWS ON IMPACT OF 2004 ANTITRUST REFORM ARE MIXED, BUT SUPPORT 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION 21-22, 24 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/ 
GAO-11-619. 
243 See id. at 59-62. 
244 See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 95. 
245 If mean figures are used, the total value of the imposed sanctions has been only 15% to 
21 % of the optimal level. If median figures are used, the imposed sanctions averaged only 9% to 
12% of optimality. 
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and if these higher amounts were imposed by the courts on price 
fIxers,246 would consumers be optimally protected from becoming cartel 
victims. 
To arrive at this conclusion we made many assumptions and 
estimates. As noted throughout this Article, we believe that every time 
we made necessary assumptions and estimates we chose alternatives that 
were conservative (Le., they would tend to increase the relative size of 
the imposed sanctions relative to their optimal level).247 Similarly, as 
noted, we have attempted to ascertain every relevant piece of data for 
every cartel in our study as accurately as possible. 248 Nevertheless, even 
if some of our assumptions or estimates are off, or if some of our cartel 
data is inaccurate, our conclusion that sanctions should be increased at 
least fIvefold is quite robust. It is unlikely to be wrong by very much. It 
is very unlikely that the overall existing level of sanctions only should be 
doubled. 249 
One of our controversial assumptions was to value the deterrence 
effects of a year in prison or under house arrest as the equivalent of a $6 
million sanction. We readily admit this fIgure is arbitrary and that 
reasonable people could select a different amount. Although we believe 
$6 million is more than the average that a year of confInement should be 
valued at, one could argue that in light of how hard people try to avoid 
prison, how much defendants spend in legal fees to avoid prison, how 
wealthy many price fIxers are, and how time spent in prison might lower 
individuals' future income and social status, we should be using a 
signifIcantly higher fIgure. 
However, even assuming a year in confInement produced the 
deterrence equivalent of $12 million or $24 million would not change 
our conclusions signifIcantly. Even the assumption that a year of 
confInement produced $365 million in deterrence would not mean that 
existing sanctions are adequate. Only if a year of confInement were 
246 It is possible, however, that some courts might find ways to avoid imposing dramatically 
higher sanctions. For example, courts might not want to impose prison sentences five times as 
high as the current ten-year maximum sentence for price fIXing. As a practical matter courts 
might be able to find ways not to do so. 
247 Similarly, to conservatively assess whether the current overall levels of sanctions are 
optimal, we used full or high estimates of the sizes of existing sanctions at every opportunity. By 
contrast, an Article dealing with related topics, Lande & Davis, supra note 14, made low 
assumptions about the recoveries from private cases, a methodology that tended to understate 
the magnitude of the benefits from private litigation. 
248 Complications include the fact that many of the cartels at issue cover more territory than 
the United States, and that it is difficult to disentangle U.S. effects from transnational effects. 
249 An additional factor must, moreover, be considered whenever a cartel is international in 
scope: Fines and private damages actions brought under the U.S. antitrust laws reflect only 
purchases made by buyers in the United States. See F. Hoffmann LaRoche Ltd. v Empigran S.A., 
542 U.S. 155 (2004). If a significant percentage of the cartel's sales and profits are generated 
outside the United States, sanctions based solely upon what happens in the United States will 
result in Significant under-deterrence. 
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assumed to have the same deterrence value as an outlandish $4.4 billion 
to $6.3 billion fine would our overall conclusion change.25o Only under 
this fantastic assumption could we fairly conclude that the current level 
of sanctions is sufficient. Under any reasonable assumption about the 
deterrence value of prison and house arrest, the current level of 
sanctions is far too low. 
For our sample of seventy-five recent cartels that operated in the 
United States and internationally, their median overcharge was 
approximately 19% of their sales. We also found that they were 
sanctioned almost the exact same amount-a median sanction of 
approximately 17% of their sales. If they had been certain they would be 
caught, forming most cartels would have been a close call, because the 
benefits (19%) would have been only slightly larger than the costs (17%). 
Unfortunately, the best evidence is that, historically, cartels in the 
United States have faced only a 20% to 24% chance of being discovered 
and convicted. Thus the "costs" of being punished are reduced to an 
expected 4% of sales, not 17%. This is an important reason why U.S. 
sanctions imposed on cartels would have had to have been on average 
five times higher to truly discourage most firms from colluding. 
We found only one unusual cartel (out of seventy-five for which we 
could assemble the necessary information) for which the totality of 
sanctions was approximately optimal, and possibly somewhat supra-
optimal. 25 ! A second cartel was probably optimally sanctioned.252 The 
other seventy-three cartels, however, were sub optimally sanctioned, 
many substantially. 
Concerns about over-deterrence are simply inappropriate. We 
believe that one reason there currently are so many cartels operating in 
the United States (and, indeed, the world) is that even though firms do 
not have all the specific data or analysis presented in this Article, 
prospective cartelists do have a rough appreciation that their chances of 
getting caught and convicted are relatively small, and that the penalties 
they would be likely to face if this happened would probably be modest. 
250 Calculated as follows (in 2010 dollars): Total U.S. overcharges in our sample of seventy-
five cases were $182 billion. To account for the allocative inefficiency effects of market power 
we multiplied this by 1.03 to 1.20. See supra Part IILB. This result ($187-218 billion) was 
divided by 20% to 24% (the chances of a cartel being detected and convicted). See supra Part 
IV.B. This means that our optimal sanctions goal is $779-$1090 billion. 
The actual sanctions (in 2010 dollars) were $20.5 billion in settlements, plus $5.1 billion in 
fines, which totals approximately $26 billion. The prison and house arrest total was 2031.8 
months, or 169.32 years. 
The current amount of sanctions for these seventy-five cartels could be sufficient to deter 
collusion optimally only if the sum of $26 billion and 169.32 years in prison and under house 
arrest equals between $779 billion and $1090 billion in sanctions. This would occur only if each 
year of prison or house arrest has the sanction equivalent of $4.45-$6.28 billion. 
This analysis assumes that fines and private recoveries remain unchanged. 
251 See discussion of the E-Rate Federal Internet Program cartel supra Part V.B. 
252 See discussion of the PVC Window coverings cartel supra Part V.B. 
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Coupling these low and uncertain probabilities with the relatively high 
prospects of significantly higher prices over a substantial period, many 
prospective cartel managers conclude that the risk is well worth taking. 
In other words, we believe that many or most prospective cartelists 
share the intuition behind the opinion voiced by Judge Easterbrook at 
the beginning of this section that crime pays. In the spirit of Judge 
Posner's battlefield imagery, the "cluster bombs" that constitute the 
current anti-cartel sanctions have been duds. 
A. Effects of Results on Cartel Sanctions and Detection 
There are two general strategies for improving the deterrence 
power of antitrust enforcement against cartels. One could increase the 
sanctions. The other possibility would be to raise the probability of 
detection and conviction. The proposals that follow do both.253 
Perhaps the most straightforward policy conclusion that follows 
from our study would be to quintuple the overall current u.s. cartel 
sanction levels. A modest, ultra-conservative step in the right direction 
would be to double the average sanction level. This would almost 
certainly beneficially deter collusion and thereby save victimized 
consumers and businesses billions of dollars per year. Nevertheless we 
recognize that even a decision to double existing sanctions254 is political 
in nature and is almost certain to be greeted with strong opposition. 
This political reality has prompted us to consider alternative policy 
prescriptions. 255 We instead propose nine steps that perhaps might be 
perceived as somewhat less controversial by those convinced that the 
nation's antitrust traditions are wise public policy. Only the last two 
would require new legislation. 
First, the budget of the Antitrust Division should be increased 
significantly and earmarked for cartel enforcement. If the Division were 
able to pursue more investigations, it surely would detect and prove 
more cartels. As part of its use of these funds, the Division would have 
253 Some of the proposals that follow, such as numbers 5, 6, and 8, fit well into the 
framework of conventional optimal deterrence theory. Others, such as numbers 2, 3,4,7, and 9, 
could perhaps better be termed behavioral in nature. 
254 If sanctions were doubled, this study could be re-done after a few years. Perhaps, for 
example, even doubled levels of sanctions would cause many of the most risk-avoiding cartel 
members to avoid collusion or turn in existing cartels. If the results of this future optimal 
deterrence study showed that the overall level of cartel deterrence had not increased to an 
acceptable level, the sanctions could be increased still further. 
255 Some of the proposals that follow fairly could be termed "behavioral," even though this 
paper's overall approach has been to employ the standard optimal deterrence model. See supra 
note 31 for why this is appropriate. 
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to commit to bring more cases where they were less than certain of 
victory. 256 
Second, our modest and very imperfect survey of imprisoned price 
fIxers shows it may not be unusual for a corporation to retain and even 
reward employees who violate the antitrust laws. 257 We found that 
approximately half of those who served a prison sentence for their crime 
subsequently found employment for their previous employer or another 
employer in the same industry.258 Too often, the corporate attitude 
towards price-fIxing felons has been that they "took a bullet for the 
team" and should be rewarded. Such felons ought to be stigmatized, not 
awarded a badge of honor. The DOJ should re-do our study and, if the 
problem is in fact a signifIcant one, as part of its settlement negotiations, 
should require corporations never to hire people who have ever been 
convicted of an antitrust violation in the same industry.259 Similarly, 
convicted price fIxers should agree, as part of their sentence 
negotiations, never to work for a firm in the same cartel again. This 
means that convicted price fIxers will lose their jobs and be prevented 
from direct or indirect future employment with their employer or with 
other fIrms in the same industry, a sanction that may be very powerful 
indeed.26o 
Third, the Department should require convicted corporations to 
agree not to pay the fInes incurred by their employees, directly or 
indirectly, or to compensate them for time spent in prison or under 
house arrest, directly or indirectly.261 It is unclear how often this occurs, 
but it should never happen. 262 
256 For example, in 2010, the DOJ won forty-one cartel cases and lost only one. See supra 
note 25. The public interest probably would have been better served, however, if their budget 
had allowed them to bring one hundred cartel cases, even if they lost ten. 
257 See supra notes 48-64. We repeat our caveat as to the extremely tentative nature of any 
conclusions based upon this survey, and urge others to perform a more rigorous analysis of this 
issue. 
258 See supra note 48. 
259 This proposal should be extended to prohibiting future service contracts with the former 
employer lest the convicted employee become an employee in the guise of a "consultant." For 
additional compliance related possibilities, see Competition Law Compliance, OFFICE OF 
FAIR TRADING, http://www.oft.gov.uk!OFTwork!competition-act-and-cartels/competition-Iaw-
compliance (last visited Sept. 26, 2012). 
260 Some believe that the loss of one's job often can be even a more powerful sanction than 
imprisonment. See supra note 84. The DOJ should conduct its own survey as to what happens 
to convicted price fixers after they leave prison, a survey that would be much more rigorous 
than the preliminary one we were able to carry out and report in Part I.B. 
261 Making this condition a standard clause in plea agreements is quite feasible and places 
the burden of monitoring on the employer. Corporations rarely, if ever, violate their plea 
agreements and, presumably, would be subject to penalties if they did so. 
262 An analogous proposal that goes much further was made by Judge Ginsburg and 
Professor Wright. They believe negligent corporate officials should be debarred from working 
for any publicly traded corporation. See Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 25. Since their proposal 
would apply to the negligent corporate officials who should have prevented the antitrust 
violation, not just to those convicted of the offense, and it would bar them from employment at 
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Fourth, the Antitrust Division already has a "Wall of Shame" on its 
Web page-a list of every company that has paid more than $10 million 
in antitrust fines. 263 This should be extended to individuals for several 
years after their conviction. The DOT could host, for example, a web 
page containing the names and photos of people given sentences of at 
least 6 months in prison. 
Fifth, cartel fmes are calculated using a formula promulgated by 
the u.S. Sentencing Commission. 264 The lynchpin of this formula is its 
estimate "that the average gain from price-fixing is 10 percent of the 
selling price."265 However, in Part III.A we presented the results of two 
sets of data that show average cartel overcharges of 49% and 31 %, and 
median overcharges of 25% and 22%, for the economic study and the 
verdict data sets, respectively.266 A conservative, yet quite important, 
step the U.S. Sentencing Commission could take267 would be to double 
its presumption that cartels raise prices by an average of 10%. This could 
increase fines substantially. 
Sixth, the DOJ could change its administrative practice of awarding 
fine discounts from the bottom of the Guideline's range and start instead 
from the top of the range. We expect that this change also should result 
in average corporate fines that are much larger than their current 
levels. 268 
Seventh, the DOT could require stricter corporate compliance 
programs. Some, for example, have advocated the use of corporate 
monitors for convicted defendants.269 Currently, the DOT does not 
require those admitted into the leniency program to have or implement 
compliance programs, and it certainly is possible that the Widespread 
any publicly traded company, not just the companies that employed them when they violated 
the antitrust laws, their proposal would go much further than simply preventing these punished 
executives from returning to their former employers. It would, however, require new 
legislation. A much milder-and not totally dissimilar-sanction is in effect today. Firms that 
fix prices can be barred from bidding on contracts with the u.s. government. We believe this 
does not happen very often, but it could be done more frequently. 
263 Sherman Act Violations Yielding a Corporate Fine of $10 Million or More, U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal!shermanl0.html 
(last updated July 31, 2012). 
264 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Rl.l(d)(l) (2005). 
265 Id. § 2Rl.l application n.3. For an explanation how this 10% presumption results in the 
current fine levels, see Connor & Lande, supra note 14, at 522-24. 
266 See supra Part III.A (quoting Connor & Lande, supra note 14, at 541). For the most 
recent years the figures were slightly lower-the thirty post-1990 domestic U.S. observations 
had a mean overcharge of 26.2% and a median overcharge of 24.5%. rd. 
267 Technically, Sentencing Commission changes to the Guidelines are subject to 
Congressional approval, but histOrically, these resolutions have been approved unanimously. 
268 Because fines are almost always a matter of negotiation, the fines might not double 
simply because the U.S. Sentencing Commission's formula indicates they should double. 
269 See D. Daniel Sokol, Behavioral Remedies for Cartels? End to Fines for Leniency 
Applicants and the Case for Corporate Monitors (Jan. 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
me with the authors). 
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use of corporate monitors could help deter collusion. 
Eighth, legislation could add prejudgment interest to both private 
treble damage actions and criminal fines. 27o This would increase the 
effective size of these sanctions substantially, especially for durable 
cartels or cartelists that use delaying tactics during plea bargaining or 
litigation. Even though any legislation that increased sanctions is likely 
to face strong opposition, this change has the advantage of being a 
change that intuitively should strike many people, including Judges 
Easterbrook27I and Posner,272 as reasonable. 
Finally, the United States could implement a whistleblower-reward, 
or bounty system, for individuals who turn in cartels, and perhaps even 
for corporations.273 Bounty proposals have the potential to enhance 
cartel detection and to destabilize cartels even more than the current 
leniency and amnesty programs. The bounties could be introduced 
gradually, and could be limited to individuals. 274 If this approach is not 
successful, some have advocated that it be introduced on the corporate 
level. 275 If, for example, the annual discovery rate of cartels does not 
decline after the other proposals in this section have been in effect for a 
number of years, a bounty might be awarded to corporations that turn 
in cartels, even if they had once been a member of the cartel. Perhaps 
amnesty recipients could be given 10% of all the other cartel 
participants' fines in egregiously harmful cases (for example, bounties 
could be limited to cases where affected sales exceeds $1 billion, or 
where the cartel members were recidivists).276 
270 The U.S. Sentencing Commission could add prejudgment interest to current cartel 
penalties without new legislation. 
271 As Judge Easterbrook noted in Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 583-84 (7th Cir. 
1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting): 
[T]he time value of money works in defendants' favor. Antitrust cases can be 
long-lived affairs. This one has lasted 14 years, 2 112 of which passed between the 
finding of liability and the award of damages. During all of the time, the defendants 
held the stakes and earned interest. ... To deny prejudgment interest is to allow the 
defendants to profit from their wrong, and because 14 years is a long time the profit 
may be substantial. 
Virtually the entire profession of financial economists would agree with these principles. 
272 See Judge Posner's opinion in Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc., 841 F.2d 751, 752 
(7th Cir. 1988) (discussing the appropriateness of contact damages: "[T]he major inadequacies 
being that pre- and post-judgment interest rates are frequently below market levels .... "). 
273 The UK's Office of Fair Trading and the Korean Fair Trade Commission already have 
these policies in place for individuals. 
274 See William E. Kovacic, Private Participation in the Enforcement of Public Competition 
Laws, in 2 CURRENT COMPETITION LAW 167, 173-75 (Mads Andenas et al. eds., 2004); see also 
Cecile Aubert et al., The Impact of Leniency and Whistleblowing Programs on Cartels, 24 INT'L J. 
INDUST. ORG. 1241 (2006). 
275 See Giancarlo Spagnolo, Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust, in HANDBOOK OF 
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 259 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008). 
276 If 10% proves to be an insufficient bounty, it could be increased to 20%, or whatever fine 
level proved to be optimal. It might even be optimal to give all of the fines collected from a 
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B. Effects on Other Parts of the Antitrust System 
This Article's conclusions should have consequences far beyond 
the basic issue of whether the current levels of cartel sanctions should be 
raised. For example, in 1977 the U.S. Supreme Court granted standing 
only to direct purchasers of supracompetitively priced products, in large 
part because of its fear that suits by indirect purchasers would lead to 
"duplicative" payments. 277 The majority of states reacted by enacting 
"Illinois Brick Repealers" to permit injured indirect purchasers to sue 
for damages. 278 It often is asserted that these state laws lead to six-fold 
damages279 (in addition to possible criminal penalties), and therefore, to 
over-deterrence. In light of this Article's conclusion that the current 
overall level of anti-cartel sanctions-a total that includes payments in 
indirect purchaser cases-should be increased at least five- fold, the 
Court's fear is unwarranted. On the contrary, indirect purchaser suits 
and state indirect purchaser laws should lead to more nearly optimal 
deterrence. 
Moreover, as a general matter, many respected scholars believe that 
judicial fears that the private treble damages remedy is excessive-even 
before the other cartel sanctions are considered-systematically biases 
the results of antitrust litigation in defendants' favor. 28o Many believe 
cartel to the amnesty recipient! 
277 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
278 See Robert H. Lande, New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the 
Real Victims of Antitrust Violations, 61 ALA. L. REv. 447,448 (2010). 
279 There have been a number of variations of the argument that the combination of "treble" 
damages for direct purchasers, plus another "three" for indirect purchasers, plus disgorgement, 
plus fines of two-fold damages, can lead to six-fold, eight-fold, or more overall damages paid by 
a cartel or monopoly. See, e.g., Michael L. Denger, A New Approach to Cartel Enforcement 
Remedies Is Needed, 2002 ABA Spring Antitrust Meeting 15 (meeting held Apr. 24-26, 2002) 
(unpublished draft) (on file with the authors). This fear shaped the ABA's proposal in this area. 
See also Richard M. Steuer, Report on Remedies, 2005 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST REp. 3 (One of the 
"key features" of their proposal is that "[tlhere would be no duplicative recovery under the new 
cause of action.... the proposed statute would eliminate the possibility of duplicative 
recovery."). 
280 As former FTC Chairman William E. Kovacic observed, 
[Al court might fear that the US statutory requirement that successful private 
plaintiffs receive treble damages runs a risk of over-deterrence. A court might seek to 
correct such perceived infirmities in the anti-trust system by recourse to means 
directly within its control-namely by modifying doctrine governing liability 
standards or by devising special doctrinal tests to evaluate the worthiness of private 
claims .... The courts will "equilibrate" the antitrust system in one of three ways. 
Judges will: Construct doctrinal tests under the rubric of "standing" or "injury" that 
make it harder for the private party to pursue its case; [aldjust evidentiary 
requirements that must be satisfied to prove violations; or [aliter substantive liability 
rules in ways that make it more difficult for the plaintiff to establish the defendant's 
liability. 
See Kovacic, supra note 274, at 173-75. 
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that a fear of over-deterring or unduly penalizing defendants often 
causes judges to favor defendants when they formulate substantive 
antitrust rules, when they measure ambiguous factual situations against 
these rules, and when they devise appropriate standing rules. 281 
Similarly, in otherwise close private cases judges might unduly resolve 
ambiguities in defendants' favor when they compute damages because 
they believe the resulting award-after the mandatory trebling-will be 
excessive. A fortiori, a remedy system that includes not only "excessive" 
private damages but also incarceration and corporate fines could cause 
virtually every area of antitrust to develop unduly in defendants' favor. 
This result would be desirable only if the sanctions, when considered 
together, are indeed excessive. However, this Article demonstrates that 
for cartels, by far the most common and important type of private case, 
the opposite is true. Courts should resist any temptation to be lenient on 
lawbreakers out of a fear that they are being sanctioned too heavily. 
Although we have cited critics of antitrust who are concerned 
about over-deterrence, at the same time, there are others who exhibit a 
great deal of complacency-sometimes tinged with triumphalism - that 
U.S. enforcement is the oldest, best developed, and most effective in the 
world. Pride in the antitrust idea, one of our country's most successful 
peaceful policy export, is understandable. But justified delight in our 
accomplishments can become prosecutorial hubris tantamount to 
obliviousness in light of the continuing high rates of cartel detections 
and the results of this Article's analysis. To truly protect American 
consumers and businesses from tremendous illegal overcharges, 
vigilance and increased efforts are crucial. 
In short, the inquiry undertaken by this Article is not just relevant 
to the crucial issue of whether the overall level of cartel sanctions should 
be changed. Almost every piece of the extraordinarily complex and 
interconnected antitrust system is affected by the field's belief as to 
whether the current level of cartel sanctions is optimal. We believe that 
almost every portion of the antitrust system should be re-examined in 
light of this Article's analysis and conclusions. 
281 ld. See also Stephen Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, with 
Special Attention to Summary Judgment and to Motions to Dismiss, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST 
LITIGATION 185 (Lawrence White ed., 1988), and the sources cited therein, particularly the 
reference to a similar analysis by Areeda and Turner, id. at 191. Professor Calkins discusses 
how many areas of antitrust law might have developed more narrowly because of the effects of 
damages awards that the courts believed were at the threefold level. ld. at 191-95. He concludes 
that "class actions probably would be more easily certified were there no trebling." ld. at 197. 
Professor Calkins also demonstrates why "it seems probable that trebling is a factor in" causing 
courts to scrutinize "damage claims more rigorously than they once did." ld. at 198. "Plaintiffs 
would find standing rules more hospitable in a single damage world." ld.; see also Stephen 
Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating 
Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. lO65 (1986). 
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